







THE INTERNET’S IMPACTS ON POWER DIFFERENTIALS  

















A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements 















© 2014 Megan Ortagus 




Through case studies and empirical statistical research, this thesis tests the 
theory that information and communications technologies (ICT), specifically the 
Internet, is a casual factor in shifting the global balance of power away from 
dominant states towards individuals and smaller states. The Internet affords acute 
advantages to individuals and smaller states, but it has yet to prove decisive against 
an armed nation state with the will to use violence, particularly in the case of 
aggressive authoritarian states. This thesis argues that while ICT exposes states to 
new security threats and a transference in power may be underway, the current 
evidence suggests that a dominant nation state’s security apparatus is still a more 
potent force, for now.  
These conclusions were reached through a holistic examination of ICT’s 
impact on security through the lenses of state versus state conflict (interstate), 
citizen-led revolutionary movements (intrastate), and violent non-state actors 
against the system (“extrastate”).  However, this thesis found no conclusive data to 
support the notion that the Internet is concurrently revolutionizing interstate, 
intrastate or extrastate conflict to the point whereby a weaker adversary can 
achieve a desired political outcome through the unique use of cyber tools.  While 
cyberspace adds a new virtual dimension to conflict, much like airpower added a 
third dimension to military conflict after World War I, cyber weapons have not yet 
developed to the point where they can replace weaponry in the physical domains. 
The Internet has neither fundamentally altered human nature nor the desires and 
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competitions that fuel conflict; it may be transforming the experience of conflict, but 
not necessarily the outcomes. 
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A new phenomenon is altering the human experience: the rapid development 
and deployment of information and communication technologies (ICT) has changed 
human behavior by transforming information distribution, commerce, and culture.1 
These technologies have affected life for billions of Internet users, and even have 
indirect impacts on those people without direct access to the Internet.2  
Furthermore, unlike any other form of mass media in history, the Internet is an open 
platform where users both consume and produce information.3  While it is clear that 
the Internet has meaningfully affected particular aspects of modern society, exactly 
how these technologies are reshaping warfare, terrorism, and civil uprisings 
remains unsettled. The Internet has brought core structural changes to societies, 
with profound implications for the security of nation states. 
Through case studies and empirical statistical research, this thesis tests the 
theory that ICT, specifically the Internet, is a casual factor in shifting the global 
balance of power away from dominant states towards individuals and smaller 
states.  If so, shifting power dynamics will be manifested in interstate conflict, 
dissident movements, and non-state actor ambitions: wars will be fought differently, 
citizens will have more leverage over authoritarian states, and transnational groups 
will approach parity with states in the international system. An important 
                                                          
1 Benkler, Yochai. The Wealth of Networks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 1. 
2 Nye, Joseph. “Cyber Power”, http://web.mit.edu/ecir/pdf/nye-cyberpower.pdf (accessed October 16 
2010). 
3 "A Virtual Counter-Revolution," The Economist, September 4, 2010, 76. 
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determining factor for judging ICT’s effects on traditional security constructs is the 
manner by which states and individuals adapt to new power differentials.   
The information age presents unique vulnerabilities for dominant players, 
which lesser ones have had some success in exploiting. However, this thesis will 
argue that while ICT exposes states to new security threats and a transference in 
power may be underway, the current evidence suggests that a dominant nation 
state’s security apparatus is still a more potent force, for now. The Internet affords 
acute advantages to individuals and smaller states, but it has yet to prove decisive 
against an armed nation state with the will to use violence, particularly in the case of 
aggressive authoritarian states. As this thesis will demonstrate, this overarching 
conclusion was reached through a holistic examination of ICT’s impact on security 
through the lenses of state versus state conflict (interstate), citizen-led 
revolutionary movements (intrastate), and violent non-state actors against the 
system (“extrastate”)4, each of which will be examined in a distinct chapter. 
Chapter one addresses a high-profile policy topic in Washington today: the 
degree to which cyberwar is now central to interstate conflict.  This chapter 
compares and contrasts the debates between theorists on the substantive 
consequences of the Internet on war, including the ramifications for how militaries 
will now define war, the very nature of war, and how power is distributed among 
armed states. Does the Internet have inherent transformative properties that will 
render other forms of warfare irrelevant and level the playing field for weak states 
                                                          
4 “Extrastate” is term created for this paper to juxtapose the variant transnational non-state actor conflict 
against the better defined interstate and intrastate conflicts.  
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due to ICT’s low cost of entry? Or is the Internet simply an inchoate tool in any 
state’s arsenal, and not coercive enough to result in new military elites?  
The first chapter attempts to contextualize cyber warfare by discussing the 
geopolitical contests from which it arose. It uses a theoretical framework first 
posited by Eliot Cohen 1996 to evaluate two key interstate conflicts with prominent 
cyber elements between Russia and Estonia in 2007, then Russia and Georgia in 
2008. The chapter concludes that cyber warfare, as deployed by Russia, did not 
meet all of Cohen’s tests for a transformational military technology. The Russian 
cyber attacks against Estonia inflicted temporary pain, but were insufficiently 
coercive to produce the desired political outcome. The cyber attacks against Georgia 
served as a force multiplier for Russia’s overwhelmingly superior conventional 
military, but there is no evidence to indicate the outcome would have differed 
without the cyber campaign. Russia’s limited cyber victory in Estonia was bloodless, 
but also far less efficacious than its conventional military success. In these case 
studies, the singular use of the Internet to conduct cyber attacks did not alter 
countries’ power position, nor did it dramatically revolutionize how wars are fought 
between nation states.  
The case studies from chapter one were chosen from the available literature 
since they represent interstate conflicts with well-documented cyber attacks by 
which a nation state attempted to achieve a political goal, setting them apart from 
routine cyber criminality and cyber espionage or sabotage. Further, Russia’s conflict 
with Georgia provides an opportune control case to contrast with its conflict with 
Estonia in analyzing the impact of ICT on intrastate conflict. 
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The conclusions reached as a result of examining these two case studies are 
by no means definitive and further research is necessary, especially as cyber 
weapons evolve and nation states build more formidable cyber defenses.  Of note, 
chapter one was completed in the fall of 2013, before the conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine over Crimea in spring 2014.   Future research should evaluate the cyber 
elements in this crisis against Cohen’s framework.   
Chapter two explores the Internet phenomenon and its effects on internal 
state security to determine if ICT is altering existing power dynamics between the 
individual and the state.  This chapter is primarily concerned with the argument that 
the Internet creates a competitive advantage for dissidents inside authoritarian 
states, which would in turn make revolutions more likely.5  It categorizes the 
incipient schools of thought on the Internet to build an intellectual framework in 
which critical questions can be addressed: Is there a new causal relationship 
between ICT and successful revolutionary movements? If individuals have more 
access to ICT in authoritarian states, is the likelihood of revolution increased?  
The second chapter analyzes instances of collective ICT usage by Green 
Movement protestors in Iran following the 2009 Presidential elections to determine 
whether the Internet was working to the advantage of the agency or the state. For a 
more nuanced understanding, this chapter also examines the historical relevance of 
earlier communications tools, such as the telegraph, cassette tape, and television, in 
Iran during prior reform and revolutionary movements, notably the 1890s tobacco 
                                                          
5 The term “competitive advantage” is one I have borrowed from economics, specifically Michael Porter’s 
1990s theory, and applied to the ICT phenomenon. For the purposes paper, competitive advantage 




protests and the 1979 revolution. Both of these are control cases that enabled the 
evaluation of ICT’s impact on revolution, as compared to prior developments in 
communications technology. 
The findings from the Iranian case study suggest that from the telegraph to 
twitter, there is ample historical evidence that communications tools have uniquely 
enabled the spread of information beyond Iranian state control and have provided 
dissidents with an open yet underground space to disseminate ideas and to 
mobilize.  Contrarily, as a catalyst for revolutionary movements, the ICT’s 
performance record is unreliable and has only a marginal success rate against 
nation states like Iran with sophisticated censorship regimes that blunt the 
Internet’s effectiveness for subversion. 
 In aiming to evaluate the effect of ICT on individual and state power 
differentials, this thesis chapter required cases that were consistent in popular 
revolts against governments, providing some correction for differences in cultural 
variations.  Iran offers a very good case with a 5000-year-old civilization and 
multiple revolutionary attempts within the past 200 years. From within this 
paradigm, the Green Movement was selected from the abundant literature because 
it was also the most relevant example of a dissident movement consciously choosing 
to mobilize based on an Internet utopian philosophy.  This philosophy espouses the 
Internet is a democratizing force that makes traditional organizational structures 
obsolete, favoring networks over hierarchies. It is a strategy that has failed thus far 
to bring about revolution in Iran.  
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 Chapter three confronts the post September 11, 2001 conceit that the 
Internet’s pervasive spread of information and ideology has empowered 
transnational groups against the global political order. Specifically, this chapter 
evaluates whether ICT has increased the probability that international terrorist 
organizations will acquire and deploy a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). In 
chapter three, theory and probability encounter reality in that a terrorist group’s 
increased access to knowledge on the Internet did not enable it to overcome the 
extent challenges of acquisition and deployment.   
Attention to the relationship between violent non-state actors’ (VNSA) ICT 
usage and unconventional weapons is especially important when discussing 
transnational groups that operate in opposition to the formal nation state system, 
and seek to overturn the existing order (defined in this paper as “extrastate”).  If 
new media use strongly correlates to increases in VNSA acquisition and deployment 
of WMD, then it speaks to the Internet’s potential influence on 21st century power 
realignment. A transitional group that obtains even a crude nuclear device is on a 
more level playing field with nation states, providing it a source of significance and 
recognition that other forms of terrorism do not afford, thus challenging the 
alignment of small powers and great powers that has dominated history.  
 The third chapter tests the aforementioned theory by presenting an 
empirical analysis of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
datasets. It combines a review of three prominent statistical studies with original 
quantitative analysis to determine if there is in fact a strong correlation between ICT 
growth and WMD threats. The model created for this paper plots CBRN incidents 
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from 1990 to 2013 against data on global Internet penetration rates. In this case, the 
data from the pre-Internet age serves as a control to contrast with more recent 
terrorist attempts to obtain and use CBRN weapons. The model reveals that the total 
CBRN linear trend line is slightly decreasing over the time plotted, but is probably 
more prudently classified as flat due to the small-n sample size of the available data. 
Thus, there is no evident correlation between the rising number Internet users and 
terrorist attempts to acquire CBRN despite conventional wisdom’s suggestion that 
knowledge diffusion equates to more WMD incidents by non-state actors. 
 The limited amount of open source data on CBRN events makes it impossible 
to rely solely on empirical analysis; therefore, the third chapter also surveys the al-
Qaeda organization’s WMB pursuits. The al-Qaeda case study in this chapter was 
chosen because of the rich amount of publicly available information compared to 
other terrorist groups with similar WMD aspirations. The research concludes that 
the Internet was pivotal to al-Qaeda propagating a religious justification for WMD 
attacks, gathering knowledge on WMD, communicating with technical experts, 
coordinating attack plans, and providing virtual training to would-be jihadists.6 7  
However, the allied governments’ aggressive counterterrorism responses 
after the September 11th attacks have quelled al-Qaeda’s WMD program, making it 
apparent that other factors such as a permissive operating environment, freedom of 
movement, access to skilled technicians, and financial resources are ultimately more 
                                                          
6 Hoffman, Bruce. RAND, "Congressional Testimony: The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists." Last 
modified May 2006. Accessed June 17, 2013. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf. 
7 Forest, James, and Sammy Salama. Jihadist Tactics and Targeting. Jihadists and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Edited by Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett. Boc: CRC Press, 2009. 
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important in aggregate than the benefits the Internet affords. Conversely, the 
Internet arguably saved al-Qaeda from extinction through virtual propaganda and 
proxies, and allows the group – and its CBRN threat – to survive, albeit in a less 
substantial form.  
As previously discussed, the independent variable tested in this thesis is the 
Internet, but for the purposes of this paper many terms such as ICT, cyberspace, 
new media, and the fifth domain are used interchangeably. The Internet is a 
transnational telecommunications system connected by a series of networked 
computers connected to other networked computers around the world, otherwise 
known as a “network of networks.”8 9 Most observers incorrectly equate this 
definition with the World Wide Web when in fact the Web is just one of the systems 
used to access the Internet. It is an important distinction since this thesis is not only 
concerned with the Web but all of the elements that individuals use on the Internet, 
such a mobile phones, social media, satellite connections, email, instant messaging, 
and so forth. Traditional media is defined by platforms like radio and television and 
are not encompassed in the definition of new media for this paper, although they do 
have important historical contexts. 
Finally, “power” is broadly defined as the ability to secure one’s political 
objectives, but this thesis is most interested in testing a narrower definition of 
power: the degree to which the isolated use of cyber elements allows one to achieve 
political objectives. For a successful experiment, power differentials (the dependent 
                                                          
8  "A Virtual Counter-Revolution," The Economist, September 4, 2010, 75. 
9 "Internet Basics," Florida Center for Instructional Technology, 
http://fcit.usf.edu/Internet/chap1/chap1.htm. (accessed November 19, 2010). 
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variable) must be altered significantly by the independent use of ICT. Events where 
the outcomes would not be dramatically different with or without the cyber 
campaign are considered null. As this thesis will detail in the following three 
chapters, the hypothesis presented above will fail: the use of the Internet in 
interstate, intrastate and extrastate struggles transformed the experience of warfare 
in some instances, but it did not significantly alter power differentials in any of the 











CHAPTER 1 – CYBERSPACE AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT: RUSSIAN 
CASE STUDIES FROM 2007-2008 
Every month, U.S. government ICT networks experience approximately 1.8 
billion cyber attacks against Congressional and Federal agencies.10 Industry analysts 
estimate that cybercrime could cost corporations upwards of one trillion dollars 
annually in stolen intellectual property and identity datasets.11 In 2008, the 
Department of Defense experienced the “most significant breach of U.S. military 
computers ever” when a foreign intelligence agency placed an infected flash drive 
onto a classified computer.12 Undoubtedly, global connectivity facilitated by the 
Internet has advantageously transformed much of modern life, but it has also 
generated new and unanticipated vulnerabilities for individuals, industry, and 
governments.  
In the context of warfare, technical experts and theorists are at odds over 
how exactly cyberspace is impacting nation state competition.  While some purport 
that the Internet simply represents a new tool available to militaries, others contend 
that it has innate transformative properties that will eventually render others forms 
of warfare irrelevant. If this is the case, traditional notions of state power must be 
thoroughly reassessed. This chapter seeks to understand whether the Internet is 
substantively affecting warfare between nation states, and if so, what the 
ramifications are for how society perceives warfare and conflict, the very nature and 
definition of war, and how power is distributed among competing states. This paper 
                                                          
10 McConnell, Mike. Cyber Insecurities: The 21st Century Threatscape. America's Cyber Future, Volume II. 
CNAS, 2011. https://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume II_2.pdf (accessed 
September 30, 2013).  
11 Ibid.  




will begin with a review of the salient literature on cyber war and the fundamental 
theories under debate, followed by an examination of two key Russian case studies 
using a framework for evaluation posited by Eliot Cohen in 1996.  
Literature Review 
To construct a coherent theoretical framework for cyberspace, one must 
contextualize the broader “information revolution” from which the Internet’s 
purported transformational properties are derived. Contrary to some assertions,13 
the “fifth domain” is not man-made but rather it is encompassed in the 
electromagnetic spectrum,14 15 which is exploitable because of technological 
invention. Just as earth’s atmosphere was not man-made, human innovation in the 
form of aircraft allowed for the exploitation of airspace in pursuit of military 
objectives. 
Figure 1.A - The Electromagnetic Spectrum16 
  
                                                          
13 Nye, Jr., Joseph. The Future of Power. New York City: Public Affairs, 2011. 
14 Kuehl, Daniel “The Information Revolution and the Transformation of Warfare,” in Karl de Leeuw & Jan 
Bergstra editors, The History of Information Security (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2007): 823 
15 Hare, Forrest. 2007. “Five Myths of Cyberspace and Cyberpower.” SIGNAL Magazine (June). 
http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1333&zoneid=209
. 
16 "Electromagnetic Spectrum." http://www.yorku.ca/eye/spectru.htm (accessed November 21, 2010). 
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While there is considerable debate over whether all or part of the 
electromagnetic spectrum should be characterized as a new battle space domain, it 
is clear that a new information environment has emerged, which is “characterized 
by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify 
and exchange information via networked information systems and 
infrastructures.”17 According to Daniel Kuehl, this information environment is 
defined by three elements: connectivity, content and the cognitive.18 “Connectivity” 
refers to physical and human connections through technical devices; “content” 
contains the words, images, and actions that are shared globally through 
connectivity; and the “cognitive” is the arena of influence and perception. 19  
Though cyber technologies are already having an impact on the realms of 
military and grand strategy, theorists and practitioners have not agreed upon a 
unified definition for what constitutes cyber war. Nor have they defined the types of 
actions in cyberspace that would characterize acts of war and could in turn ignite 
conflict in the physical world.20  This is not surprising given the rapidity at which 
the fifth domain, also known somewhat narrowly as “cyberspace,” has developed. 
Nevertheless, the lack of clear definitions not only muddles the waters of theory, but 
also creates uncertainty and miscommunication in international affairs. 
Historically, military scholars and strategists have struggled to define 
operational concepts and adapt to new domains in their infancies, affecting both the 
                                                          
17 Kuehl, Daniel “The Information Revolution and the Transformation of Warfare,” in Karl de Leeuw & Jan 
Bergstra editors, The History of Information Security (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2007): 823 
18 JHU class notes; Fall 2010 
19 JHU class notes; Fall 2010 
20 Mahnken, Thomas. Cyberwar and Cyber Warfare. America's Cyber Future, Volume II. CNAS, 2011. 




development of international norms and slowing military reorganization.  For 
example, air power revolutionized war by making conflict three-dimensional.21 
Among other advantages, the advent of air forces altered the nature of 
reconnaissance missions, since for the first time commanders gained an aerial view 
behind enemy lines.22 However, despite air power’s outsized role during World War 
II, including devastating strategic bombing campaigns and delivering a nuclear 
payload, the U.S. Air Force did not become a separate branch of the U.S. Military 
until 1947, after the war ended.23 Additionally, airplanes first crossed international 
borders to bomb other countries in 1917 during World War I. Yet, it was not until 
1926 that international law was agreed upon to declare that a country’s sovereign 
borders existed in the air as well.24  
Cyberspace is no exception. In 1969 the Defense Department’s ARPANET, the 
precursor to the modern Internet, began a “rudimentary” exchange of digital 
packets of information between computers. By the early 1980s, the first computer 
viruses were created.25 In 1989 the World Wide Web was launched; the prolific 
search engine, Google, debuted in 1998.26 Yet, it was not until 2009 that the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense authorized the creation of the United States Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM), which was finally fully operational on October 31, 
                                                          
21 Dr. Tami Biddle (Fall 2009); speech at Johns Hopkins University. 
22 Ibid. 
23 http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=2 (accessed 1 December 2010) 
24 JHU class notes; Fall 2010 
25 Nye, Jr., Joseph. Cyber Power. Manuscript, Harvard Kennedy School, 2010. 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf. 
26 Ibid. 3 
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2010.27 Problems persisted, since USCYBERCOM was mandated with protecting the 
Defense Department’s .mil networks only, whereas 90 percent of the American 
Internet system is civilian and no U.S. government agency has “line responsibility” 
for securing those networks.28 The United States government has therefore required 
over four decades to only begin adapting to its own invention.   
Schools of Thought 
Because cyberspace is a relatively new area for conflict, scholarship on cyber 
conflict has been fragmentary, often focusing heavily on the technicalities of 
networks, or alarmist predictions, such as a “cyber Pearl Harbor,”29 not rooted 
soundly in empirics.30  Hans-Igne Langø argues that there is “…little common 
understanding of the conceptual and theoretical nature of cyberspace as it relates to 
security,” complicating a systematic evaluation of cyber’s effects on war and power 
dynamics. 31   
Langø has categorized the nascent schools of thought on cyber security into 
three groups:  Revolutionist, Traditionalist, and Environmentalist.32 In Langø’s view, 
the “Revolutionist” thinkers believe that the Internet can greatly alter armed 
conflict, asserting that the latent revolutionary characteristics of the fifth domain 
                                                          
27 "Fact Sheet." U.S. Cyber Command (blog), August, 2013. 
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/ (accessed November 3, 2013). 
28 McGraw, Gary, and Nathaniel Fick. Separating Threat from the Hype: What Washington Needs to Know 
about Cyber Security. America's Cyber Future, Volume II. CNAS, 2011. 
https://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume II_2.pdf (accessed September 
30, 2013). 
29 McConnell, Mike. Cyber Insecurities: The 21st Century Threatscape. America's Cyber Future, Volume II. 
CNAS, 2011. https://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume II_2.pdf (accessed 
September 30, 2013). 
30 Langø, Hans-Inge. Slaying Cyber Dragons: Competing Approaches to Cyber Security. Working paper, 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2013.  
31 Ibid. 5 
32 Ibid. 5 
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are transforming the very nature of war.33 Conversely, “Traditionalist” thought 
rejects the notion that the nature of war is being transformed by the information 
revolution, contending instead that information technology will not upend the 
normal order in international relations.34  
Langø’s third cyber security group, the “Environmentalist” thinkers, is the 
newest and least cogent of the three groups.  They assert that traditional 
international relations theory does not translate easily into cyber security 
discussions due to the Internet’s “unique nature.” 35 Environmentalists are 
essentially Revolutionists in scope but prefer to emphasize the Internet’s non-
violent properties and power transference, while trying to deflect away from the 
Internet’s role in warfare.  It should also be noted that Langø’s three classifications – 
Revolutionist, Traditionalist, and Environmentalist – are generalized groupings and 
major variations in opinion exist within each category.  
The following will utilize Langø’s cyber security classification framework to 
analyze three key deliberations in current cyber war scholarship, ranging from the 
philosophical to the practical. These points of contention were plucked from the 
existing literature in order to compare and contrast the “competing approaches” to 
cyber security of which this author believes are the essential arguments framing the 
current debate.   
                                                          
33 Ibid. 9 
34 Ibid. 19 
35 Langø, Hans-Inge. Slaying Cyber Dragons: Competing Approaches to Cyber Security. Working paper, 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2013. 
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What is Cyber War?  
 Prussian Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously theorized, “…war is 
simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”36 
Traditionalist Thomas Rid describes Clausewitz’s three criteria that must be fulfilled 
for actions to be considered acts of war: violence or potential violence; the threat of 
force to compel an adversary; and an articulable political objective.37 The 
fundamental question in cyber conflict is this: can cyber war exist without physical 
(or political) violence or attribution to achieve one’s desired political ends? Thomas 
Rid argues it cannot, and that not a single cyber attack to date has fulfilled all of 
Clausewitz’s definition of war.38  
 While fellow Traditionalist Thomas Mahnken agrees that cyber war (which 
he defines as the independent use of the cyber instrument to achieve strategic 
objectives) has yet not occurred, he does not dismiss its potential. Rather, Mahnken 
argues that some instances of cyber warfare have occurred when nation states 
employed cyber tools as a force multiplier in larger military conflicts.39 Thus, in his 
view, cyber war is unlikely to be decisive on its own, but “cyber warfare in support 
of other military instruments is likely to be an increasingly prevalent form of 
combat.”40  
Environmentalists Greg McGraw and Nathaniel Fick provide their own view 
on cyber war claiming that cyber war must have a kinetic or “consequential impact 
                                                          
36 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, LLC, 2008. 
37 Rid, Thomas. 2013. Cyberwar and peace. Foreign Affairs 92 (6) (11/01): 77. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Mahnken, Thomas. Cyberwar and Cyber Warfare. America's Cyber Future, Volume II. CNAS, 2011. 
https://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume II_2.pdf (accessed September 
30, 2013). 
40 Ibid. 58 
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in the physical world.”41 This contrasts with Mahnken’s view, as his framework 
requires that an act of cyber war not cross into the physical world. McGraw and Fick 
present a hypothetical scenario where an adversary infects the opposing state’s 
command and control systems for Unmanned Combat Aerial Systems, causing them 
to launch weapons at the wrong targets.  This, they argue, would constitute an act of 
cyber war; whereas this scenario seems to fit Mahnken’s view of cyber warfare, 
because the cyber act is enabling the physical domains for kinetic action. 42 
The definitional discrepancies do not end there. While one could dismiss 
these differences as parsing of phrases, the lack of an established concept on cyber 
war has stymied efforts to analyze the cyber domain, establish international norms, 
and reorganize national security bureaucracies. These discrepancies in definition 
are unlikely to be resolved easily, because they drive to the core of the strength of 
the cyber domain: as Kuehl elaborates, the fifth domain technically exists in both 
physical and virtual worlds, and is not confined to geographic boundaries. 43 This 
renders the definition of dimensions a lofty task, perhaps explaining the glacial pace 
at which the U.S. government has adapted to developments in this domain since the 
1970s. Of note, Revolutionist contributions to the cyber war definition debate is a 
far more expansive topic which must be summarized in the context of the cyber’s 
impact on the nature of warfare itself. 
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Nature of War  
 What is described today as the Revolutionist school of thought on cyber war 
is rooted in the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) theories that were first 
articulated over three decades ago.44 Eliot Cohen, writing in the mid-1990s, 
described RMA’s beginnings in the 1980s when Soviet strategists, such as the chief 
of the general staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, promulgated notions of an “imminent 
technical revolution.”45 American theorists were evaluating ICT’s influence on 
warfare as early as 1976, when defense analyst Thomas P. Rona “coined the term 
‘information warfare’ in a report on the potential vulnerabilities of U.S. weapons 
platforms that had become reliant on computer systems.”46 Early Revolutionist 
theorists John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argued that future warfare would be 
determined by competition in effectively collecting and exploiting battlefield 
intelligence, and rather than simply deploying the most capital, labor, and 
technology onto the battlefield.47 
The period after the first Gulf War, when the technologically superior U.S. 
military crushed an Iraqi military with a half million troops who were equipped 
with relatively advanced Soviet weaponry, further fueled the RMA speculations. 
Andrew Krepinevich in 1994 posited that American military operations in that Gulf 
War did not meet the historical criteria for RMA, but strongly suggested the United 
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States military was on the precipice of revolutionary change.48 Arguments such as 
these spawned even more terms like “network-centric warfare” (or “netwar”), 
Strategic Information Warfare (SIW), and Computer Network Operations (CNO), 
among others. Some contend that this line of thinking arguably influenced U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to dedicate relatively few forces 
during the Second Gulf War.49 50  Traditionalists, like Fredrick Kagan, criticized 
these experimental warfare theories as “exotic” and “increasingly divorced from 
reality”51 since they emphasized collapsing the enemy through technological 
superiority, while ignoring the Clauswitzian need to construct a positive political 
end-state after combat operations, which he believes hampered the second 
American mission in Iraq. 52  
Today, contemporary Revolutionists like Robert Miller and Kuehl postulate 
that technological achievements in communications from Gutenberg’s printing press 
to wireless Internet have produced an “omniconnected” world, giving birth to a 
revolution in military affairs, which is transforming warfare through a new 
operational medium: cyberspace.53 Some modern Revolutionists, having suffered 
somewhat of a defeat of their ideas in the Second Gulf War when primitive 
insurgents stymied the technologically superior coalition forces, have adjusted their 
theories. They now argue that in the 21st century, cyberspace is emerging as the 
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decisive battlespace where the victors of strategic conflicts will ultimately be 
determined.54 55 The popular focus is now less on information dominance in the 
battlefield (although some remain vocally supportive of that notion) and more about 
how the cyber domain is changing the nature of war by supplanting established 
conflict domains, an effect which they believe has the potential to overturn the 
existing world order.56  
Traditionalists fervently disagree. Mahnken critiques the cyber 
Revolutionists on their fundamental point; he contends that they have failed to 
articulate a casual theory for how exactly the independent use of cyber war will 
achieve political ends in a manner that supersedes the relevance of other domains.57 
In fact, Erik Gartzke contends that many of the real-world examples of cyber acts 
that Revolutionists use to underpin their claims are more appropriately defined as 
cyber espionage, cyber sabotage, or cybercrime.58  He argues that some cyber acts 
are merely an augment to traditional military actions, and what many call cyber war 
is really just an “…adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, existing forms of political 
violence.”59  
                                                          
54 Ibid.  
55 Gartzke, Erik. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth." International 
Security 38, no. 2 (2013): 41-73. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Mahnken, Thomas. Cyberwar and Cyber Warfare. America's Cyber Future, Volume II. CNAS, 2011. 
https://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume II_2.pdf (accessed September 
30, 2013). 
58 Gartzke, Erik. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth." International 





Both Revolutionists and Environmentalists accept that ICT “erodes 
hierarchies, collapses time and distance, and empowers networks,”60 thereby 
deteriorating traditional power structures and creating new vulnerabilities for 
larger states.61 While Revolutionists and Traditionalists have conflicting views on 
the cyber domain’s importance in military affairs, Environmentalists have adopted 
the Revolutionist opinion of the Internet’s inherent transformative properties and 
applied it to a loosely defined concept of “cyber power.”62   They define of cyber 
power as “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in 
other operational environments and across the instruments of power.”63  
The principal argument of Joseph Nye, a leading Environmentalist thinker, is 
that a great political shift is underway in which power is diffused from governments 
to individuals, and will eventually create a “non-polar” world.64 While positing an 
intriguing theory, Nye comes up short in providing empirical data to support his 
Environmentalist thesis, mainly because he is portending how the world could 
appear many decades from now. Nye acknowledges that governments are the most 
powerful actors at present, and he envisions a future where nation states are less 
important in individuals’ lives in part because cyberspace reduces “power 
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differentials among actors”65 since the “barriers to entry in the cyber domain are so 
low that non-state actors and small states can play a significant role at low cost.”66  
Some pessimists within the Revolutionist camp agree with Nye’s Evolutionist 
theory, but view this as a strategic vulnerability that could lead to a cyber Pearl 
Harbor unless nation states are quick to properly defend against said vulnerabilities. 
Thus some Revolutionists propose top-down, whole of government solutions like a 
national cyber security center modeled after the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), as proposed by the former Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Mike 
McConnell.67  
Traditionalist Sean Lawson provides an alternative perspective on 
pessimistic Revolutionists who postulate “cyber-doom scenarios,”68 such as an 
attack akin to a “cyber 9/11.”69 By utilizing scholarship from disaster sociology, 
military history, and the history of technology, Lawson asserts that much of the 
present cyber-doom hypotheticals are rooted in technological determinism.70 He 
describes this as the “‘feeling that our collective life in society is uncontrollable’ as a 
result of our increasing dependence on technology.”71 Present day technological 
determinism is not an anomaly; Lawson draws a corollary to public reaction to the 
telegraph in the early 20th century: the then-new transcontinental communication 
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network the media described as a “new space” gave rise to the fear that “wire devils” 
– perhaps analogous to computer hackers – could use the telegraph to crash the 
entire U.S. economy.72 
Additionally, one must be note that Traditionalist thinkers are directly 
opposed to the Environmentalist and Revolutionist belief that the Internet provides 
a comparative advantage to weaker states under the auspices of war. Nye states that 
large state powers will be unable to achieve dominance in the cyber domain as they 
have in the air, land, and sea, though they will continue to exercise exclusivity on the 
use of force in the physical world.73 74 Mahnken and Gartzke counter this thesis by 
arguing that cyber cannot “compensate for weakness in other instruments of 
power,”75 and that cyber war “appears much more likely to augment the military 
advantages of status quo powers.”76  
As evidence, they cite the limited ability of states to use the Internet to coerce 
or compel a desired political outcome, unlike traditional military violence.77 Gartzke 
in particular cannot conceive of a need for a powerful state to dominate the cyber 
domain, since “cyber attacks are unlikely to prove particularly potent in grand 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 Nye, Jr., Joseph. Harvard Belfer Center, "Cyber War and Peace." Last modified April 10, 2012. Accessed 
October 6, 2013. 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21937/cyber_war_and_peace.html?breadcrumb=/projec
t/67/explorations_in_cyber_international_relations. 
74 Nye, Jr., Joseph. The Future of Power. New York City: Public Affairs, 2011. 
75 Mahnken, Thomas. Cyberwar and Cyber Warfare. America's Cyber Future, Volume II. CNAS, 2011. 
https://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume II_2.pdf (accessed September 
30, 2013). 
76 Gartzke, Erik. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth." International 




strategic terms unless they are accompanied by terrestrial military force.”78 
Mahnken concurs, noting that a cyber attack against a state’s economic 
infrastructure is highly unlikely to produce more damage than an air raid.79  Even 
those who promote preparation for cyber doom admit that there has yet to be a 
cyber attack against critical infrastructure of any consequence.80 However, the 
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and it remains to be seen if a 
catastrophic cyber attack will occur, and if so, how states should prepare 
themselves. 
In the end, all schools of thought are wanting in some fashion. Many 
Traditionalists are correct to focus on the continuing importance of the physical 
realm in military affairs and appear to have the greatest explanatory value in the 
present, but are perhaps overly dismissive of the possibilities of information 
technology in the future. Conversely, many Revolutionists and Environmentalists 
are open to those very future possibilities, but are overstate the present 
applicability of information technology to international affairs.  
Case Studies 
Many current cyber war studies fail to systematically evaluate key cyber 
attacks in the context of broader geostrategic contests, which could offer more 
sounds judgments on how the fifth domain is impacting nation state competition.  
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The following section of the paper seeks to correct that by using a theoretical 
framework to examine the evidence on two pivotal cyber events, thereby offering a 
contribution to the academic debate on the Internet’s impact on war. The scope of 
these case studies are limited to interstate cyber struggles in the context of warfare 
as surveying every element in cyber conflict, ranging from criminality to espionage, 
would be far too expansive a topic. Additionally, these case studies were selected 
because they represent two instances of interstate conflict with sizeable cyber 
components, both of which have been analyzed in depth in academia and security 
professionals.  
The first case study focuses on Russia’s 2007 conflict with Estonia. This 
conflict occurred almost entirely in the realm of cyberspace, which allows one to 
evaluate the particular utility of the cyber component as a tool for political coercion. 
Conversely, the second case study will investigate Russia’s 2008 clash with Georgia, 
which took place in both the physical and cyber domains. This case study will enable 
analysis of the cyber component’s function in a wider interstate conflict. 
To evaluate the Internet’s role as a transformative technology, this paper will 
rely on a framework first elucidated by Eliot Cohen in 1996. Cohen posited four 
questions to evaluate whether the world was on the precipice of an information-led 
revolution in military affairs: “Will it change the appearance of combat? Will it 
change the structure of armies? Will it lead to the rise of new military elites? Will it 
alter countries’ power position?”81 This framework, more so than others on the 
subject of military revolutions, affords the ability to analyze and weigh the 
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significance of a number of new military technologies across a range of cultures and 
time. This paper will apply these questions more narrowly to the Internet and gauge 
how two Russian cyber warfare case studies measure up to Cohen’s 17-year-old 
thesis.   
Russia and Estonia  
 The 2007 conflict between Russia and Estonia marked a consequential 
inflection point in the study of cyber security, as it was contested solely in the fifth 
domain. Estonia is a small but hyper-connected society that is highly dependent on 
the Internet for routine functions of the state and commerce.82 Tensions between 
Russia and Estonia dated to the Soviet Union’s 1940 annexation of the Baltic States, 
which Russia views as the Red Army’s liberation of the Baltics from Nazi forces in 
World War II.83 The Soviets memorialized that sacrifice with a bronze statue of a 
Red Army soldier in Estonia’s capital of Tallinn, as they did in many other state 
capitols in the Soviet sphere of influence.84  
During WWII and throughout the Cold War, the Kremlin sought to “Russify” 
Eastern bloc countries and conducted a mass migration of ethnic Russians to 
Estonia, intensifying ethnic tensions, an agitation that still exists today.85 For the 
minority of ethnic Russians living in Estonia, the bronze solider in Tallinn is a 
“cherished memorial of wartime sacrifice,” especially since it is ensconced in the 
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graves of Russian veterans, making the site sacred to many. However, native 
Estonians view it as a “symbol of a hated occupation.”86  
The tensions reached a boiling point in February 2007 when the Estonian 
legislature, representing the majority popular opinion, voted to take down the large 
bronze solider to rid the city center of the giant reminder of repression.87 The 
Estonian President vetoed the law to avoid inciting riots; however, on April 27, 
2007, ethnic Russians and Estonians protesting at the site clashed. The situation 
quickly devolved into rioting and looting.88 89   
To save the statue from the violence, the Estonian government moved it from 
the city’s center to the Tallinn Military Cemetery, a less visible location that Russian-
speaking minority viewed as representing a marginalization of their ethnic 
identity.90  This move failed to have its desired effect, instead igniting a nationalist 
response in Russia’s media and legislature.91 Protests spread to Moscow, and 
enraged activists blockaded the Estonian Embassy.92  
Provocations from ethnic and nationalist disputes are not unusual, but the 
cyber components, which accompanied the riots in this case study, were unique for 
the time. As the protests turned violent, a month-long cyber assault commenced, 
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crippling Estonian government and financial websites, halting online banking, 
newspaper websites, and electronic government services for days.93 In Estonia, 97 
percent of bank transactions are virtual, and even the water supply is dependent on 
the Internet, along with other critical infrastructure. These factors made the cyber 
attacks acutely uncomfortable for Estonia’s citizens.94  Distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks95 were the hallmark of the cyber campaign against Estonia, but 
hackers also disabled the Parliament’s e-mail server for a short time, defaced many 
websites, and posted a fake letter of apology from the Prime Minister on the Reform 
Party’s website.96 97  
The distributed nature of the Russian DDoS attack against Estonia refers to 
the thousands or possibly hundreds of thousands of “zombie” computers, also 
known as “botnets,”98 that in a coordinated manner simultaneously requested 
information from a targeted website. This flood of data overwhelmed the servers, 
switches, and routers and crashed chosen websites, making it impossible for 
legitimate actors to gain access.99100 This technique can also be called “swarming” 
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and is organized by hackers who hijack or even rent zombie computers to 
orchestrate an attack.101 In the case of Estonia, a government website that routinely 
averaged 1,000 visitors daily suddenly had 2,000 data requests per second.102  
 Government officials in Tallinn concluded they were experiencing Russian 
state-sponsored cyber terrorism, claiming the Internet address of one the 
computers participating in the attacks was traced to a Russian government official 
working for President Vladimir Putin.103 Moscow claimed the acts were solely the 
product of “patriotic hackers” and denied any government involvement.104 105 
Subsequent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Commission 
inquiries could not find definitive evidence linking the cyber attacks to the 
Kremlin.106 Although one NATO official suggested state involvement: “…these were 
not things done by a few individuals. This clearly bore the hallmarks of something 
concerted.”107 
Circumstantial evidence was plentiful in open source investigations; the 
Russian government did not cooperate with the Estonians to track down the cyber 
perpetrators, instead inciting greater tensions by calling the Estonians “fascists,” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
100 Franklin, Curt. "How Routers Work." How Stuff Works (blog), 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/router11.htm (accessed November 2, 2013). 
101 Herzog, Stephen. 2011. Revisiting the Estonian cyber attacks: Digital threats and multinational 
responses. Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2) (05/01): 52. 
102 Ibid. 52 
103 Landler, Mark, and John Markoff. "Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia." New York Times, 
May 29, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(accessed September 26, 2013). 
104  Silverman, Jacob. "Could hackers devastate the U.S. economy?" How Stuff Works (blog), 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/die-hard-hacker1.htm (accessed November 2, 2013). 
105 Pitcairn, Daniel. "A Missed Chance for NATO’s Cybersecurity Future." Defense One, October 23, 2013. 
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/10/missed-chance-natos-cybersecurity-future/72542/?oref=d-
interstitial-continue (accessed October 30, 2013). 
106 Herzog, Stephen. 2011. Revisiting the Estonian cyber attacks: Digital threats and multinational 
responses. Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2) (05/01): 51 
107 Ibid. 51 
30 
 
and chose not to do anything as protestors blockaded the Estonian Embassy in 
Moscow.108 109 It was not until NATO and the European Union belatedly expressed 
outrage that the Russians begrudgingly agreed to a deal brokered by Germany, and 
the blockade abruptly ended,110 suggesting Moscow did in fact have a measure of 
control over the protestors.  Cyber experts also speculate about the likelihood of 
state government collusion, noting the sophistication of what at that time was 
considered a highly complex attack, and that it was well financed using rented 
botnets.111 University of Southern California’s Douglas Thomas explained, “99 
percent of…hackers do not have the skill or the ability to organize or execute an 
attack that would be anything more than a minor inconvenience.”112 
GreyLogic, an open source cyber intelligence consulting service for 
governments, undertook in-depth analysis of the Russian military’s Information 
Warfare (IW) doctrine and the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 
2008.113  Even before the physical skirmishes began in late April 2007, “hacktivists” 
in Russian-language chat rooms and other web forums posted descriptive 
information on how to participate in DDoS attacks, and which Estonian websites to 
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target.114  GreyLogic’s analysis concluded that the Russian military has 
acknowledged utilizing cyber attacks that appear to be cyber terrorism or 
cybercrime has strategic value and creates plausible deniability.115 In the case of 
Estonia, the Russian Nashi youth movement,116 funded in part by the Kremlin, 
participated in the protests against the Estonian Embassy in Moscow and allegedly 
in the Estonia DDoS attacks.117  
 Despite the lack of a smoking gun, it seems clear that the Russian 
government decided to at least passively support (and most likely, actively sponsor) 
interstate cyber-terrorism to gain political leverage over Estonia. However, in this 
case, Russia failed to achieve its political objectives: leadership in Tallinn defied 
Moscow and moved the sacred statue to a less visible location, where it remains 
today. Further, the cyber barrage against Estonia’s critical economic and 
government websites served to alert NATO countries to their own cyber 
vulnerabilities. In 2008 NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of 
Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn to increase cooperation on cyber defense between 
NATO member nations.118 In many ways, the cyber attacks against Estonia actually 
allied them closer with NATO and may have served to decrease Russian political 
influence in Estonia.  
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Russia and Georgia 
 One year after its clash with Estonia, Russia was embroiled in another cyber 
conflict with a satellite state, Georgia. This time, the confrontation was also executed 
in the air, land, and sea domains.119  Cyber security experts contend the short war 
“represents the first instance of a large-scale computer network attack (CNA) 
conducted in tandem with major ground combat operations,”120 making it ideal to 
investigate cyber’s ability to enhance traditional arenas of warfare in a physical 
confrontation. As was the case with Estonia, the Kremlin denied involvement in the 
offensive cyber campaign, but former Director of National Intelligence Mike 
McConnell, as well as many other security experts, assessed that the assault as 
consistent with the Russian military doctrine of using cyber weapons as a force 
multiplier alongside other military capabilities.121 
 The small nation of Georgia has a population of four million and is slightly 
smaller in size than South Carolina.122 Georgia originally declared independence 
from the Russian Empire in 1918 after the Russian Revolution was underway, but 
once the Red Army was victorious, they recaptured Georgia, installed a puppet 
government, and brought it into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).123 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia once again declared independence in 1991, 
but by 1993 it had lost control of two breakaway territories, South Ossetia and 
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Abkhazia, in a conflict between Georgian troops and Russian-backed rebels.124 The 
disputed territories established independent governments but were not 
internationally recognized.  
 Georgia’s 2003 “Rose Revolution” changed the country’s trajectory away 
from a post-Soviet kleptocracy towards what many protestors and international 
observers believed was meaningful political and economic reform.125  A series on 
non-violent protests in the capital of Tbilisi forced the president and his party to 
resign, paving the way for democratic reform under Mikhail Saakashvili and his New 
National Movement.”126  
Saakashvili had more in mind for Georgia than just economic reforms: he 
desired to spur Georgia towards integration with the West, including membership in 
NATO and the European Union. To that end, Saakashvili sent Georgian troops to 
fight in both the Afghanistan and Iraq war.127 While Georgia failed in its bid for 
NATO membership,128 Moscow took Tbilisi’s overtures to the West as an affront. 
The Kremlin was further antagonized by Saakashvili’s public efforts to unify Georgia 
and gain central control over the disputed territories of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and 
Ach’ara.129 Throughout Saakashvili’s Presidency there would be intermittent clashes 
between the Georgians and Russian-supported ethnic groups in the territories. 
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Figure 1.B – Timeline of Events Leading to the Five-Day War 130 131 
 
Early April 2008 Georgian membership rejected at NATO Summit. 
16 April 2008 Russia unilaterally authorizes official relations with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
April 2008 Russia dispatches reinforcement troops to Abkhazia, reportedly in response to 
increased Georgian aggression. 
3 July 2008 Tskhinvali shelled, killing three. Convoy carrying Georgian backed South 
Ossetian interim head of government attacked. 
July 2008 Russian fighter jets fly over South Ossetia. Georgia withdraws its ambassador 
from Moscow in response to the violation of its airspace. 
15 July 2008 8,000 Russian troops train for peace enforcement operations on Georgia’s 
frontier. 
1-2 August 2008 Georgia claimed a terrorist attack left 5 policemen wounded. Georgia claimed 
that terrorist attacks hit a peacekeeping battalion and police checkpoint areas. 
7 August 2008 Georgian forces penetrate South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali in an effort to 
retake the city. Russia sends in its own forces, stating it will protect its citizens 
from Georgian aggression. 
 
As Figure 1.B depicts, it did not require much expertise to understand that 
tensions between Russian and Georgia were at an all-time high.  In July 2008, 
Ossetian rebels (probably backed by Moscow) conducted missile raids on Georgian 
villages, and in turn Georgia bombed Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia.132 On 
the night of August 7th, the Georgian Army invaded Tskhinvali to disrupt the rebels 
and recapture control of their territory in response to alleged Russian 
provocations.133 Russia responded by deploying more combat troops to South 
Ossetia, bombarding the territories and military targets inside Tbilisi with air and 
artillery strikes, enacting a naval blockade of Georgia, and occupying sovereign 
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Georgian territory that was never contested.134 135 In five days, Russian forces 
essentially defeated the Georgian military. One military analyst explained: “There 
has been no parallel to this military operation since Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait in 1990.”136 
While Russia has a long history of militarily crushing weaker satellite states, 
this conflict was noteworthy because of the novel cyber attacks that accompanied 
kinetic operations.  As in Estonia, the Kremlin consistently denied collusion in these 
attacks. However, one prominent cyber security organization assessed that the 
cyber attacks bore the hallmarks of coordination with the Russian government, if 
not state sponsorship: “the primary objective of the cyber campaign was to support 
the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the cyber attacks fits neatly into the invasion 
plan.”137 In a familiar pattern similar to Estonia, the opening cyber assault consisted 
of botnets implementing brute force DDoS attacks against Georgian government and 
media websites, shutting down 11 targeted websites.138 Notably, forensic analysis 
showed some of these botnets were previously active in Russian criminal 
organization cybercrime attacks against e-commerce websites.139 
 In the second phase of cyber operations, expert hackers on Russian language 
web forms recruited novices to participate in cyber attacks that halted or defaced 
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another 43 websites, including the National Bank of Georgia (which had to 
disconnect its internet connection for 10 days), CNN and the BBC in Georgia, among 
many others. The cyber warriors still relied on DDoS, but also manipulated website 
vulnerabilities using SQL injections140 to deface President Saakashvili’s website, 
comparing him to Adolf Hitler. 
These cyber operations effectively silenced the Georgian media, keeping Georgian 
nationals in the dark, sowing confusion and sapping morale, while serving to delay 
an international response.141 142  
Cyber attacks such as these require proper surveillance planning, 
reconnaissance, and coordination in cyberspace, analogous to the preparations for 
military operations in the physical realm. Subsequent investigations by the U.S. 
Cyber Consequences Unit (US-CCU),143 Project Grey Goose, and other cyber security 
experts revealed that the cyber campaign against Georgia originated from Russian 
civilian networks aided by Russian organized crime. Additionally, the timing, 
coordination and sophistication of those attacks indicated a professional level of 
advanced preparation and reconnaissance.144 145 146  
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According to US-CCU’s analysis, at least one of the graphic art images used by 
hackers to deface a Georgian website was created over two years prior to the 2008 
cyber attacks.147 Further, one of the main websites utilized to recruit would-be 
cyber warriors, StopGeorgia.ru, went live within hours of the Russian military 
assault and it included a list of vetted sites to target and toolkits with cyber weapons 
available for download by novice hackers.148 149 The US-CCU investigators 
explained: 
“Many of the cyber attacks were so close in time to the corresponding 
military operations that there had to be close cooperation between people in 
the Russian military and the civilian cyber attackers. When the cyber attacks 
began, they did not involve any reconnaissance or mapping stage, but 
jumped directly to the sort of packets that were best suited to jamming the 
websites under attack. This indicated that the necessary reconnaissance and 
writing of scripts had to have been done in advance.”150 
  
The Russian military operations culminated in Georgia losing control of 
approximately 20 perfect of its territory, as Russia and five other nations recognized 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. 151 An ancillary benefit of this 
conflict to Moscow was that the value of Russian oil and gas pipelines was bolstered, 
as investors and oil producers were convinced that the Caucuses are volatile relative 
to Russian routes from the Caspian Sea.152 153 Since the international community 
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offered no real response to the Russian cyber operations and allowed Russia to 
refuse to identify and arrest the perpetrators, Moscow was able to demonstrate that 
with a thin veneer of attribution cloaking, it would face no repercussions for 
offensive cyber attacks. 
Insofar as the efficacy of the cyber campaign, one should note that Russia’s 
overwhelming conventional military superiority over Georgia would likely have led 
to a similar outcome without the cyber component.  Cyber weapons caused 
confusion and decreased morale, frustrated Georgian government officials in their 
attempts to communicate their plight to the world, and disrupted financial flows. 
However, these results are typical of traditional military campaigns that attack an 
adversary’s communications systems and command and control structures.  The 
notable difference with the cyber campaign was that attribution was partially 
obfuscated and cyber warriors’ victories were attained without risking the lives of 
service personnel. Conversely, Tbilisi was able to recover more quickly from the 
cyber attacks on their networks compared to the damage that would have ensued 
from a bombing campaign. The limited cyber victory was bloodless (as compared to 
the other kinetic attacks) but also far less efficacious.  
Conclusion 
Based on the evidence in each case study, at present it does not appear that 
the Internet, as an instrument of war or warfare, meets all of Cohen’s tests for a 
transformational military technology.  That is not to say that the future possibility of 
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cyber weapons being revolutionary is negated based on these two case studies 
alone; more systematic evaluation is still needed.  However, these case studies are 
not atypical when compared across the spectrum of interstate cyber conflicts 
accessible for review, and it seems unlikely that other currently available case 
studies would meet all of Cohen’s four criteria for RMA.  
With Estonia, some contend that cyber was challenging the rules of the game 
by allowing Russia to use the anonymity of the Internet via proxies to attack a NATO 
country thereby negating the nuclear umbrella of protection.154 However, a state’s 
use of asymmetric methods or proxy groups is not new, even among nuclear-armed 
states.  While the medium of attack (cyber) was new, but the tactics (terrorism) is as 
old as war itself; ergo the appearance of combat was changed from physical 
terrorism to cyber terrorism.   More importantly, although the fifth domain attacks 
were greatly frustrating to Estonia, they were temporary in nature and not coercive 
enough on their own to produce the desired political outcome, a fundamental 
threshold that must be reached or else acts are reduced to mere criminality.  
Figure 1.C – The Cohen Matrix155 
 
 Russia vs. Estonia Russia vs. Georgia 
Q1 – Did cyber change the 
appearance of combat? Yes Yes 
Q2 – Did cyber change the 
structure of armies? No No 
Q3 – Did cyber lead to the 
rise of new military elites? No No 
Q4 – Did cyber alter 
countries’ power position? No No 
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Russia prosecuted its conflict with Georgia in the physical and cyber 
domains, and the cyber element proved to be a useful force multiplier in the context 
of a broader strategic campaign. Yet, in comparing the Russia’s conflicts with 
Estonia and Georgia, it is clear that there is no substitute for physical coercion to 
compel one’s adversary.  The cyber component in these contests had some effect, 
but was not sufficient to alter power positions, structurally change armies or lead to 
the new military elites.  
One cannot rule out the possibility of more severe cyber attacks carrying a 
greater effect; however, in that case, a state’s use of cyber attacks would no longer 
come with the masking of attribution, which was one of the primary benefits of the 
cyber tool for Russia. Rather than allowing action with impunity, a state could risk 
drawing in outside powers and face counterattacks in the physical realm if a cyber 
weapon with a lethal payload was deployed.  Thus, while cyber enables a state to 
hide its hand, the covert nature necessitates that its results be relatively 
constrained.  
One could envision a hypothetical future where the pace of technology 
progresses in such a manner that traditional comprehensions of warfare are 
overturned. What were considered at the time to be groundbreaking cyber attacks 
against Estonia and Georgia, five years later are considered a “bad joke” by technical 
experts: if executed today against websites like Amazon or Google, they would do so 
little damage that they may not even be noticed.156  
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Certainly, militaries will continue to develop their doctrines for using the 
Internet as a tool of state power and in preparing their defenses against foreign 
cyber attacks. However, the way that these developments will proceed is as yet 
unknown. In the absence of a generally accepted framework for the military’s use of 
the Internet, it would be prudent for policymakers to at the very least agree on a 
definition of cyber war and establish international norms for cyber conflict to 
increase predictability and avoid unintended military escalation. Such norms might 
designate civil cyber infrastructure as out of bounds in interstate conflict, and focus 
on defense of the civilian networks to hedge against unforeseeable threats.  As 
Cohen theorized 17 years ago, the world may be on the edge of an information-led 
transformation of war, but it is not yet at the point where one can declare that the 




CHAPTER 2 - THE ROLE OF INTERNET AND COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGIES IN MODERN IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY 
MOVEMENTS 
Harvard Law professor Yochai Benkler posits that the global economy is 
undergoing a structural change caused by ICT, which is producing an emerging 
“networked information economy,” and resulting in more freedom for democratic 
societies.157  The second chapter of this thesis uses Iran as case study to evaluate the 
phenomenon of ICT and its effects on internal state security.  This chapter will test 
the notional argument that ICT creates a “competitive advantage” for dissidents 
inside authoritarian states, thus making revolution a more likely outcome.158 This 
chapter will also review and evaluate the theoretical approaches of Internet 
utopians and their critics. To understand the applicability of ICT in Iran, this chapter 
will examine the historical relevance of media and communications tools in Iran 
during prior reform and revolutionary movements.  Finally, this chapter will analyze 
present uses of ICT in Iran by both agency and the state, to determine whether ICT is 
working to the advantage of the Green Movement or the current regime.    
Literature Review 
 Theoretical approaches can inform our understanding of the Internet 
phenomenon by providing an intellectual framework in which these questions can 
be addressed: Is there a causal relationship between ICT and successful 
revolutionary movements? If individuals have more access to ICT in authoritarian 
states, is the likelihood of revolution increased? Conversely, are ICT and 
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revolutionary movements simply correlated experiences due to a more globalized 
world?  
The incipient schools of thought regarding the Internet, its defining 
characteristics, inherent values, and potential transformative capabilities can be 
delineated into three generalized categories:  The first group are “techno-optimists” 
or Internet utopians,159 the second group are ICT pragmatists, and the third is a 
group consisting of ICT pessimists.  The principal point of contention between these 
groups is the value they ascribe to the Internet.  Internet utopians contend that ICT 
is innately democratic, while pragmatists and pessimists in general see these tools 
fundamentally as value neutral.  However, both utopians and pragmatists agree the 
Internet is shifting power differentials in favor of the individual, but pessimists view 
this as a slow evolution and a dramatic shift to the individual is futuristic, and 
maybe not even likely at all. Pessimists argue the nation state remains the most 
powerful actor as it still has a monopoly on the use of force; as such, the nation state 
maintains the power advantage, particularly in autocratic states.  All other 
arguments and tangential discussions extend from this primary judgment. 
Prior to a lengthy theoretical review, some basic concepts about the Internet 
must be explained.  First, the Internet is a transnational telecommunications system 
connected by a series of networked computers connected to other networked 
computers around the world, otherwise known as a “network of networks.”160 161 
This Internet system has profound economic and social implications.  Economists 
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view the Internet as having “network effects” meaning that since the costs for entry 
are very low, individuals are more likely to join and create.162 163  Second, it is a 
“generative” and open platform unlike any other mass media in history in that users 
are both consumers and producers of information.164  Third, the unprecedented 
speed at which information is transferred across national borders has limited 
distance and time making the Internet an efficient distribution center with the 
ability to serves as a megaphone for ideas or products.165  Conversely, the Internet’s 
stated attributes can also make information overly diffuse and saturated to the point 
of overload.   
Internet Utopians, Pragmatist and Pessimists 
As stated previously, Internet utopians ascribe democratic values to ICT but 
their belief in the technology’s scope is far more ubiquitous.  For early utopians, the 
Internet was a revolutionary tool ushering in a new information age in which the 
limitations of time, space and distance were being erased.166 167  One of the first 
techno-optimists, John-Perry Barlow, went so far as to claim the Internet would end 
the nation state as we know it, purporting the disappearance of borders due to the 
Internet because states could no longer declare sovereignty on the web.168  By 
purporting this sublime view of ICT Barlow ignored the very real physical domain of 
the Internet in which servers, computer platforms, cable modems, and electrical 
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power all exist inside the borders of nation-states.169  While Barlow saw ICT as 
enabling the end of the sovereign state, Anne-Marie Slaughter argues the result of 
ICT is realignment in global powers leading to the “relative decline of U.S. 
influence”.170 Slaughter posits that in the twenty-first century, state power is 
measured by “connectedness” because the new “networked world… exists above the 
state, below the state and through the state.”171  However, she continues this line of 
thinking by suggesting the U.S. can avoid decline by harnessing the power of 
networked ICT to sustain its competitive edge.172 
For many of these scholars and other Internet utopians, the pervasive spread 
of information by interconnected ICT is as transformative as the division of labor 
preached by Adam Smith prior to the Industrial Revolution.  But scholars are not the 
only proponents of a globalized or networked new world order created by ICT: 
neoconservatives, classical liberal economists, business persons, Marxists, 
politicians, journalists and even the current Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, with 
her “21st Century Statecraft” program find ICT to be global homogenizing force for 
good.173  Secretary Clinton’s overvaluation of ICT led her to call on the Twitter’s 
corporate headquarters to delay routine maintenance to allow protestors in Iran to 
continue using the Twitter website.  As the United States took no firm steps to 
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support the Green Revolution, it appears in this case Washington saw technology as 
a strategy unto itself rather than as a tool for tactical advantage.    
More nuanced theories have developed since the early days of the Internet.  
While many scholars espouse ICT’s attributes (speed, time, distance, diffusion, 
efficiency and social connectivity) are fundamentally changing existing structures, 
the merits and degree of those changes are not agreed upon.  Leading scholars, such 
as Internet utopians like Yochai Benkler, Clay Shirky, and David Weinberger, have 
all examined the new networked world and purport that the Internet is instinctively 
good due to its supposed democratic characteristics and is therefore a unifying and 
progressive trend for society.  For the utopians, since the Internet functions as a 
network of networks, the emphasis must be on the collective, making it intrinsically 
democratic.  This new asymmetry of the empowered individual, it is argued, affords 
a never-before available competitive advantage to dissidents living in authoritarian 
states.  ICT pragmatists and pessimists will of course take issue with this theory.  Ian 
Bremmer writing in Foreign Affairs explains, “…if greater openness creates new 
opportunities, it also creates new worries.”174 
ICT pragmatists like Joseph Nye and Ian Bremmer agree that interconnected 
information age has seen a “diffusion of power to the non-state actor” [the 
individual], but argue ICT is not necessarily democratic since it empowers anyone 
who willing to use it including criminals and terrorists.175  In Nye’s assessment of 
ICT entitled “Cyber Power”, he recognizes the “great complications” all nation-states 
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face in light of this new information age.176  According to Nye, the individual is 
increasingly at advantage in the cyber domain due to three factors: “low cost if 
investment for entry, virtual anonymity and ease of exit.”177  Governments are 
increasingly vulnerable in the cyber realm because the benefits afforded to 
individuals by ICT.  It is the nature if the Internet that makes power differentials 
between the state and the individual reduced, he explains.178  Nye’s discourse on 
cyber power dynamics and asymmetry is foundational for understanding other 
Internet utopian concepts, such as Net advantage, but his optimism is hedged by his 
underlying assumption that nation states will still remain the strongest actors for 
some time, making him a pragmatists.179   
Where Internet utopians, and to a lesser degree ICT pragmatists, envisage a 
new world order enabled by the Internet that is more democratic and more free, ICT 
pessimists see communications tools that give the illusion of power to a minority of 
activists while authoritarian states use the Internet as an “new opium for the 
masses.”180  The utopians have placed far too much emphasis on individuals while 
ignoring the inevitable response to power differentials by the nation state.  For 
example, Rebecca MacKinnon has observed the evolution of the Chinese attitudes 
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towards technology described in a new term she coined “networked 
authoritarianism.”181  
 The Chinese and the Iranian authorities do not employ wholesale Internet 
prohibition (except in extreme, time-limited cases) because their economies are 
equally dependent on communications technology, but rather they have evolved to a 
new generation of “censorship techniques” that “shape the users’ online experience 
in ways that are largely unseen.”182  This networked authoritarianism allows the 
governments of China and Iran to gain the economic benefits of globalized ICT 
without the activism that could possibly challenge their regimes.183  The 
information revolution could still lead to entropy as autocrats still desire control of 
their populations; the Internet has not changed the dictator’s strategic interest in 
maintaining his regime and he will not go quietly. 
Pessimists like Malcolm Gladwell, Eygeny Morozov, Rafal Rohozinski and 
Ronald Deibert also contend ICT cannot deliver on the revolutionary promises its 
enthusiasts purport because the Internet is not a substitute for “high-risk activism” 
which leads to tangible social or political change.184  Gladwell further advances this 
theory by arguing the Internet and social media may connect more diverse groups of 
people than before, but these ties are weak and they result in more participation in 
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activities that do not require a significant amount of personal sacrifice.185  Most 
critically Gladwell writes, “The instruments of social media are well suited to 
making the existing social order more efficient.  They are not the natural enemy of 
the status quo.”186   
Deibert and Rohozinski also discourage the illusion that there can ever be a 
technological silver bullet capable of ushering in democracy.  They write 
“Liberation, freedom, and democracy are all socially contested concepts and thus 
must be secured by social and political means.”187  A communications tool cannot 
produce a democracy; that is a political choice that must be made by humans.  The 
larger question then becomes: If the appropriate amount of high-risk activists are in 
place, can ICT act as a catalyst to aid in opening up authoritarian states as it has 
opened up countries to commerce globally? 
Internet theory is naturally an incipient field of study where the leading 
schools of thought are still forming conceptual models for expression. However, 
there are three theories by Internet utopians that require further exploration to 
have a full view of the topic. These three ideas are highlighted below. 
The Net Advantage 
 Clay Shirky, a leading authority on ICT’s social implications and techno-
optimists, created the concept of “Net Advantage” which he spelled out in his best 
seller, Here Comes Everybody: the Power of Organization without Organizations, and 
subsequent writings.  Simply put, Shirky purports the Internet has reshaped social 
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communications and civic life through social media, creating “political information 
cascades” which encourage more people to resist the regime and bestowing 
competitive advantage to the dissident.188  
Shirky’s new take on information cascades begins with political scientist 
Susan Lohmann’s theory that when a localized group is willing to publically protest 
a regime and the authority’s reaction is muted, it visibly encourages the “fence-
sitters” to join in the next round of protests.189  Further, if the regime overreacts, it 
risks delegitimizing itself.190  Shirky argues ICT presents a new dynamic in dissident 
protests whereby the information cascade is visible to more people at a faster pace 
than ever historically possible and additionally, to a wide international audience.  
Also, ICT offers dissidents the ability to coordinate action despite living under an 
authoritarian regime, thus persuading more fence sitters to join their cause. 
New Public Spheres 
 John Kelly and Bruce Etling underscore a noteworthy point about the 
Internet and social change: there is a vital need for public spheres for debating and 
exchanging ideas.  They point to John Dewey who spoke about the necessary 
“conjoint communicated experience”, which is a requirement for democracy.191  
Yochai Benkler expounds on the Dewey idea of a necessary public space by arguing 
that compared to the older mass media models, ICT is democratic and inclusive, and 
will always undermine the powerful, even if the take action against those using the 
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Internet as a weapon against their regime.192  Benkler argues the Internet is a public 
space that will always give competitive advantage to the individual.      
New Ecology of Activism 
 David Weinberger, a senior researcher at Harvard’s Berkman Center, has 
proposed a theory that the Internet is changing the ecology of human social 
behavior.  While he is dubious of the prognostication that the Internet will 
ineluctably cause regime change, Weinberger does argue ICT is affecting traditional 
institutions by changing how they work.193 When anyone with interest via the 
Internet can participate, it changes the characteristics of how that organization 
operates.  To justify this assertion, Weinberger uses the example of journalism and 
citizen journalists operating in the blogosphere:  Professional journalists still exist 
but the dynamics of the news business have been transformed by individual 
bloggers who can challenge the status quo. 
Case Studies 
Since the introduction of the telegraph in the 1850s, communications tools in 
Iran have been applied by both State power structures and agents of opposition for 
their own purposes: autocratic Shahs like Nasser-iddin and Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi have used communications tools as a powerful but limited weapon of 
propaganda to defend the legitimacy of their regimes or to expand their writ.194  
Conversely, opposition leaders like Sayyed Jamal ad-Din and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
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Khomeini have usurped the intended purposes of the State’s communications tools 
to spread their own revolutionary ideologies by creating a space for debate and 
public mobilization.195 196  
Tobacco Protests and Constitutional Revolution 
 The introduction of modern communications tools in Iran, like the telegraph 
and radio, were exogenous events.  Nasser-iddin Shah in the 1850s sought from the 
British government a rudimentary telegraph network to connect Tehran with its 
outlying provinces and thereby allow Nasser-iddin to exert greater control over 
some of Iran’s volatile ethnic groups.197  The British eagerly sponsored the creation 
of an extensive national telegraph network later in the 1860s and 1870s because 
they sought more control over colonized India through Iran.198  Iran scholar Ervand 
Abrahamian notes, “The telegraph network, expanding to cover nine thousand miles 
by 1900, connected not only London with India, but also Tehran with the provinces, 
and thus the Shah with his provincial administrators.”199  The more expansive 
British telegraph network, although initially resisted by the Shah, provided Iran a 
modern way to communicate with the outside world and was an important source 
of revenue for the monarchy.200  While envisaged as a medium to further 
consolidate monarchial rule by both the Iranian and British crowns, the telegraph 
was then seized upon by the opposition to subvert the monarchies, specifically 
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during the tobacco protests of the early 1890s and the constitutional revolution of 
1906.201  
 As the first early form of modern media, the telegraph served to import ideas, 
cultures, news and experiences from the outside world into Iran.  It helped establish 
the first newspapers in Iran by capturing wire stories from Reuters that were 
intended for use by the Indian press.202  At times the Shah’s opposition leveraged 
the telegraph by sending messages to Paris and London asking for assistance from 
Western nations against the regime, much to the Shah’s chagrin.203   
The Shah’s tobacco concession to the British monopoly in 1890 ignited the 
agrarian, clerical, and bazaar classes in revolt.  The telegraph, in combination with 
the stinging criticism in leaflets by the Islamist Sayyed Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”, 
helped speedily enrage Iranian citizens who otherwise would have heard of the 
outbreak of protests among their fellow citizens much later.204  The telegraph’s 
quick dissemination of information helped fuel widespread discontent and general 
strikes, and in combination with a fatwa ignited protests in six cities: Tehran, 
Isfahan, Tabriz, Mashad, Qazvin, Yazd and Kermanshah.205  More importantly, these 
protests allegedly revealed that realignment was underway in Iranian society 
enabled by modern communications.  As Abrahamian explains, “The crisis revealed 
the fundamental changes that had taken place in nineteenth-century Iran.  It 
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demonstrated that local revolts could now spread into general rebellions; that the 
intelligentsia and the traditional middle class could work together.”206 
After a major demonstration in Tehran where security forces killed many 
unarmed protestors, the Shah was forced to recant his concessions to the British.  
The experience afforded the opposition with its first successful reform by way of 
mass protests from a united cross section of Iranians: the clergy, intelligentsia, 
“bazaaris”, and average citizens.207 Iranians had now tasted the fruits of free 
expression and yearned for more, in particular, a constitution and the rights it 
afforded citizens.208  However, the uprising among Iranian citizens, first against 
perceived repressive economic policies and then later in the 1906 constitutional 
crisis, would not prove ultimately successful on a grand scale again for another 88 
years.     
 By extrapolating from the early experiences with the telegraph, three 
conclusions can be reached: that communications tools uniquely enabled the spread 
of ideologies and information beyond the control of the State; that regime’s intended 
purpose for the telegraph could be subverted by opposition groups for political 
mobilization; and that because of the speed and distance of the telegraph’s reach, 
elites in other countries could be alerted of dissidents’ grievances inside a closed 
regime in remarkable speed.      
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Stated Dominated Communications  
 The telegraph’s early use foreshadowed how future media would empower 
Iranians to utilize technological innovation for dissident purposes.  Radio was 
introduced to Iran when the German army established a connection using long-wave 
radio with Isfahan in 1915.209  In 1924 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s father, Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, arranged with the Soviets to obtain the first wireless telegraph, which 
would beget a radio broadcasting system by 1935.210  This technological 
advancement initially made the military more efficient.  The desire for radio 
broadcasting began with the military but it was further expanded because Reza 
Shah and his security apparatus believed in the inherent propaganda value of 
radio.211  Reza Shah’s sympathetic views towards the German Nazis during the 
Second World War eventually landed him on the wrong side of the Allies, who 
forced him to abdicate the throne in 1941.212  Just prior to the Shah’s departure, the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 1940 began a Persian language service to 
exert more influence over an Iran that many in the West feared was too cozy with 
the Germans.213   
Mohammad Reza Shah’s vision for a developed, modern state-planned 
society included support for the creation of broadcast media.214  The Shah sought to 
project his desired image of Iran into the homes of his citizens via the popular 
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mediums of radio and television.  The Shah’s top-down approach to media sought to 
“manufacture legitimacy” for his rule, as was consistent with contemporary theories 
of modernization since he viewed media as a utilitarian means to spread modern 
social norms.215 Concurrently, rigid censorship of independent journalists and a 
muted political climate greatly limited the development of Iranian civil society and 
offered no forum for political debate, all to accomplish the Shah’s vision of a 
nationalist and almost anti-clerical modern Iranian state.216  In short, “Big media 
became the tool of [a] big authoritarian [state].”217  
 Unlike the telegraph and radio, television’s introduction into Iran resulted 
from the domestic private sector and American innovation, rather than from a state-
centric dictatorial plan.  The pioneering and well-connected Sabet family received 
approval from the Shah and through the Majilis to build a television broadcast 
system in Tehran.  In 1958, the Sabet’s first broadcast went live with an 
orchestrated speech from the Shah.218  However, a medium so powerful and 
compelling like television would not last long outside state control: by 1966, the 
Plan and Budget Organization began allocating funds for television development 
and procurement.  In October of that year, the state-owned National Iranian 
Television was born and eventually overtook the Sabet family’s organization.219  For 
the Shah, television was instrumental in solidifying his attempts to remake Iran into 
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his nationalist vision; by 1974, televisions were in the homes of an estimated 15 
million, or about half of the population.220  
Media Makes Revolution? 
The causality of the Iranian revolution is an often-debated subject since the 
overthrow of the Shah in 1979.  While this paper will not address causality of the 
1979 revolution, a subject more appropriately covered in book volumes, it is 
important to review the role media played.  Theda Skocpol, a foremost scholar on 
the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions, notes the Iranian experience was 
quite unique from the “classical” revolutions of the past.  The 1979 Iranian 
revolution was both a social and political revolution fueled by rapid modernization, 
which Skocpol had argued in her early works was not possible.221  The Iranian 
revolution also was not characteristic of other historical revolutions that were led 
by the lower classes, as Skocpol had again contended in earlier works.222   
In stark contrast, the Iranian revolution was an amalgamation of social 
classes with the educated urbanites and religious elites leading the way.  
Additionally, Skocpol admits to being vehemently critical of those who suggested 
revolutions were orchestrated or could ever be “made.”223  To her credit, Skocpol 
writing in 1982 suggests the Iranian revolution, “…did not just come; it was 
deliberately and coherently made.”224  The purpose of addressing the revolutionary 
causality is to understand what role the media may have played in the orchestration 
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of the revolution.  The social discontent was guided and fueled in part by Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s mass-propaganda via the cassette tapes or “electronic pulpit” (minbar) 
and photocopied posters, night letters and political statements (elamieh).225 With 
regard to the use of media to foment discontent, Khomeini himself said, 
“Propaganda is [as] explosive as a grenade.”226  
Differing somewhat from the opposition during the tobacco protests and the 
Constitutional crisis, Khomeini and other dissidents did not initially co-opt mass 
media; instead he and his followers subverted the Shah’s state-controlled “big 
media” conventions (I.e. Television and radio) with creative “small media” tactics.  
Small media tools, such as the cassette tape and photocopier, performed the vital 
functions revolutionary movements need under authoritarian regimes: propagating 
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Figure 2.A - Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shah227 
 
Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi writing in Small Media, 
Big Revolution testify about their firsthand accounts of small media as a “catalyst for 
political participation” in the Iranian revolution.228  Long before “twitter 
revolutions” were in vogue, the Mohammadis advanced a communications theory of 
revolution to be applied specifically to authoritarian states: “mediated culture has 
become part of the causal sequence of revolutionary crisis, as well as central to 
revolutionary process.”229  However, they are very cautious to avoid determinisms; 
small media by itself does not make revolution.230 
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Khomeini’s propaganda successes during the revolution were in large part 
due to five factors: he was a charismatic authority figure who became the de facto 
leader of the popular revolt231; a broad based coalition supported the movement 
(largely due to clerical organization)232; they had a clear message “Death to the 
Shah”233; a clear political goal “independence, freedom, Islamic Government”234; and 
the military was incapable or unwilling to act against them.235  Khomeini’s genius 
was not just his inventive use of media but rather the application; he harnessed 
traditional social and religious networks to spread revolutionary sentiments rapidly 
through audiocassettes and photocopied leaflets.236  
Since independent political parties and a free press were not permitted 
under the Shah, the alternative public sphere became the deeply socially integrated 
mosque network.  In essence, small media in Iran can be thought of as the first forms 
of what is defined today as “social media”.   For example, the modern podcast or 
YouTube clip is analogous to Khomeini’s cassette tapes.  These illicit 
communications distributed through influential social and religious channels 
allowed for the underground dissident movement to gain strength despite the 
watchful eyes of the SAVAK237. The Shah notably underestimated the compelling 
nature of Khomeini’s taped sermons by allowing his relocation to Paris.  Being in 
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Paris enabled the reproduction and worldwide distribution of Khomeini’s cassette-
taped sermons and raised his profile on the international stage.238  
The Iranian example of “small media” networks successfully fomenting 
ideological dissent inside closed states and more importantly, in organizing an 
opposition movement, should be balanced with knowledge of the international 
notoriety that Khomeini gained in Paris.  In his first eight weeks in France, Khomeini 
took full advantage of the international press, sitting for interviews with Le Monde, 
the Associated Press, French, German, Austrian, Swedish and Greek broadcasters, 
America’s CBS News and Britain’s The Guardian newspaper.239  For someone with 
virulent anti-Western and anti-American sentiments, Khomeini shrewdly managed a 
public relations campaign that validated his messianic image both at home and 
abroad.   
There is historical precedence in Iran, from the tobacco protests and the 
1979 revolution to the Green Movement today, where opposition groups have either 
usurped the state’s control over mass media for revolt; or utilized small media 
distributed through traditional social networks to undermine the authoritarian 
regimes.  With each historical example observed, it becomes apparent that 
communications tools have provided dissidents with the ability to mobilize, as well 
as offer an open space to disseminate revolutionary ideals; however, theorists and 
historians still debate whether communications tools are proximate to change or 
ultimate causes of change.   If media were an ultimate cause of change, then its 
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performance record has thus been unreliable and produces only a marginal success 
rate when viewed in context.   
Iran’s Twitter Revolution? 
 The final section of this paper will analyze the so-called Green Movement in 
Iran as a case study to test the thesis questions posed at the start.  In authoritarian 
states, does the Internet provide dissidents with a comparative advantage to force 
desired social or political changes?  The Iranian conundrum presents the most 
relevant case study available as the conflict between the nation state and the 
individual, empowered by ICT, promulgated the popular notion that a “twitter 
revolution” could result in regime change.   
To outside observers, the Green Movement in Iran appeared to be an 
anomaly: a sudden awakening of Iranians who were propelled forward in protest 
against the Presidential election results due to the innovative uses of the Internet 
and social media tools.240  Regime critics in the West, most prominently The Atlantic 
blogger Andrew Sullivan, declared “the sound of the next revolution” was 
underway.241  That specious interpretation of the election protesters has become 
conventional wisdom but ignores Iran’s long legacy of civil disobedience.  Iranian 
professor and author, Azar Nafisi, explains, “…there is always something going on in 
Iran…a girl like Neda, had been part of Iranian society as long as I can remember.”242  
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This chapter has documented the ample historical evidence of media used by 
individuals against the state in Iran: from the telegraph during the Tobacco and 
Constitutional revolution over 100 years ago, to the use of “small media” in the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, journalists and student communiqués in the Khatami years, and 
social media (like Twitter and Facebook) in the 2009 Presidential election 
protests.243  The events of 2009 should be judged in the historical context of Iran’s 
press and media legacy.  The precedent can offer some hope for budding reformists; 
but revolutionaries and their Western supporters should proceed with caution in 
assuming the Internet is a panacea for all of the problems that ail Iran and other 
troubled states. 
The Green Movement 
 The Green Movement began as a mass rejection of the alleged fraudulent 
June 12, 2009 Presidential election results; however, some academics argue the 
roots go back much further to the Persian quest for democracy during the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906.244  Former Presidential interpreter, Hooman 
Majd, sees the Green Movement as an expansive outgrowth of the mowj-e-sabz or 
“the green wave”, which was the tech-savvy political campaign to support 
Presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi.245  
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The Green Movement’s name derives from a green sash given to Mousavi by 
the former reformist President, Mohammad Khatami.246  It is understood that 
Mousavi chose green because the color is also associated with the descendants of 
the Prophet Mohammad (Mousavi is counted as one).247  Ostensibly, the Green 
Movement leaders248 were Mousavi and his wife Zahra Rahnavard but other notable 
figures include the movement’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Montazeri (deceased 
December 2009), and reforms advocate Mehdi Karroubi (also a 2009 Presidential 
candidate).249  In opposition were the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini, 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and former President Akbar Rafsanjani 
(originally a supporter of the Greens and then sided with Khameini).250  
 In 2009, the structure and nature of the Green Movement was amorphous.  
The movement began as a rejection of the election that kept Ahmadinejad as 
President, when three million protestors poured onto the streets of Tehran in 
opposition to what appeared to be fabricated ballot results.251  The early phases of 
the Green Movement were not an organized hierarchy; rather, it was akin to a non-
violent mob where the participants chanted, “Where is my vote?”252  Mousavi’s 
green wave “morphed” from an election campaign into a mass protest 
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demonstration and then to a social movement and civil rights movement, producing 
the largest and broadest reform coalition since the 1979 revolution.253 254  
Equally, the movement’s goals appeared to evolve throughout 2009 and 
2010.  Mousavi campaigned on a platform of reform within the existing paradigm, 
which is a theocratic authority (vilayat-e faqih) that supervises the semi-democratic 
elected officials including the president and members of the parliament (Majilis).  It 
is vital to understand that Mousavi’s green wave election campaign spoke of reform 
rather than revolution and that Mousavi praised the Supreme Leader during his 
campaign speeches.255   
In general, the early Mousavi supporters and the green movement protestors 
were not iconoclasts.  They did not demand an overthrow of the Islamic government 
either.  Rather, they called for an investigation of the fraudulent election and with 
the possibility of a new election to ensure their votes would be properly counted.256  
It was not until the brutal crackdowns by Iran’s security forces and the systemic 
rape and torture of dissidents in Evin prison that protesters directly attacked the 
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Ayatollah Khomeini chanting, “Khameini is a murderer and his leadership is 
void.”257 
ICT in the 2009 Election and Protests  
 During the 2009 election, Mousavi’s green wave supporters and the 
campaign itself utilized new media tools to build support for Mousavi’s candidacy 
and persuade voters that his policies would lead to a more fruitful and prosperous 
Iran. He appeared on traditional media outlets like Al Jazeera and in the Tehran 
Times, 258 but he also maintained an active website, Facebook and Twitter pages. His 
campaign also employed a SMS text messaging campaign to mobilize voters, and 
created official campaign songs and videos uploaded to YouTube and other digital 
mediums.259 260 261  
The almost unlimited access to ICT by the Mousavi campaign was due to the 
fact that he was an official candidate for President, which meant that he was vetted 
and approved by the Guardian Council. Abbas Milani explains that it would have 
been nearly impossible for the Council to deny Mousavi the opportunity to run since 
he had strong revolutionary credentials and was the former Prime Minister during 
the Iran-Iraq war.262  Once Ahmadinejad was declared to have won a second term as 
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President, the regime quickly squelched the Mousavi camp’s unfettered access to the 
Internet.  
Figure 2.B – Digital versus Traditional Media Freedom263 
 
Iranian dissidents living in the west have heralded the Internet as serving as 
a “virtual public square” where Iranian civil society has an outlet for free “cyber” 
expression.264  But the picture looks bleaker when viewed up close.  Freedom 
House’s initiative, “Freedom on the Net” measures Internet and digital freedom in 
countries across the globe. Out of 195 countries scored, Iran ranked #181 (tying 
with China and Rwanda) in Internet and other digital restrictions.265  Freedom 
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House has judged its record of abuses as worse than Syria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and 
Pakistan. 
The Open Net Initiative has tested the Iranian regime’s control mechanisms 
on the Internet and found Tehran employs one of the world’s most sophisticated 
filtering mechanisms.  The pervasive censorship is preventative by blocking 
predetermined words, phrases or opposition websites.  Portals, websites, emails, 
SMS text messages, and blogs are under constant surveillance and often blocked by 
an array of bureaucratic monitors.  The chart below, created for this paper, 
illustrates the various levers of control exerted by Iran’s Supreme Leader, President, 
and the Majlis.   
As complex as the graphic appears, the myriad system of censorship, 
surveillance, and legal code governing the Internet has at times proved even too 
byzantine for Iranian watchdogs to manage, allowing hackers and dissidents an 
inadvertent degree of virtual freedom.  As such, some Iranian dissident are in a 
virtual cat and mouse game with the regime’s security forces, constantly trying to 
stay one step ahead of the latest censorship techniques.  This chart does not imply 
that the regime is unsuccessful at censorship, but rather a pattern has emerged 




Figure 2.C – Censorship Chart of Press and Media in Iran 
 
Conclusion 
Even though Iranian dissidents were able to utilize sophisticated 
communications tools like the Internet, their ability to force a regime change or 
even fundamental reforms was still very limited due to three factors that are 
unconnected to the regime itself: First, the Green Movement had no clearly defined 
political goals. For the movement to maintain cohesion despite the rigid security 
crackdowns, it needed to be seen as seizing the momentum from the Islamic state. 
Second, the Green Movement no longer has a “call to action” or unifying message to 
draw in a diversity of supporters. During the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
genius was his ability to clearly define the goals of the revolution, and have the 
masses repeat these phrases relentlessly during the protests. As Mohammadi notes, 
“…the dominant slogan of the movement was marg bar Shah, literally “Death to the 
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Shah.”266 Khomeini’s goals during the last revolution were unambiguous; he clearly 
called for an end to the Pahlavi monarchy and replacement with an Islamic 
government. The Green Movement fails this test.  
Finally, related to the lack of cohesive political goals and messaging was the 
anemic leadership at the top of the Green Movement. Karim Sadjadpour explains 
that originally the grassroots and Internet driven aspects of the Green Movement 
were viewed by leading activists as a more democratic way to manage the 
movement since they were not relying on one single leader who could be 
“decapitated” by the regime, causing a major blow to their efforts.267 While the view 
of the Internet as a democratizing force that makes traditional organizational 
dissent obsolete is in keeping with current Internet utopian theorists, it is a strategy 
that has failed the movement in Iran to date. 
As of the writing of this paper268, the visible protests on a grand scale have 
now diminished.  The movement failed to force a legitimate investigation of the 
ballot rigging or a new election, but most analysts contend the religious regime has 
suffered permanent damage its credibility.269 In August 2009, Mousavi reportedly 
formed a new group, “The Green Path of Hope” with the goal of organizing the 
millions who supported him during the Presidential election and then protested in 
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the streets.270  His spokesperson, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, explained the movement’s 
reorganizational phase stating they were “…expanding from the big cities to the 
smaller towns and making connections abroad while sharpening goals and ideas.”271   
Dissident use of ICT in Iran today is characteristic of how other forms of 
media were employed in of Iran’s past.  Despite rigid controls, the Internet and 
mobile phones can provide limited virtual forums for dissent, mobilization and 
coordination in the absence of physical space.  These technologies have also allowed 
Iranian dissidents to signal their democratic desires to the international community.  
However, while communications tools have proved an important element in post-
modern revolts against authoritarians, history reveals a spotty record of success.  
The Green Movement and other Iran dissident groups need continued open lines of 
communication to obtain their desired reforms.  In the case of the Internet, 
continual subversion of the censors will be a challenging feat that forces citizens to 
constantly outmaneuver the regime.  Thus far, despotism and suppression have 
been highly successful for the state and it appears that “bullets…trump tweets.”272  
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CHAPTER 3 – WMD TERRORISM: NEW MEDIA’S IMPACT ON THE 
CBRN THREAT 
Technological advances in ICT have enabled the exponential growth of access 
to information in the past two decades. This has created global parity for 
information gathering among those with access to the Internet, roughly 2.7 billion 
people or 39% of the world’s population.273 While the second chapter of this thesis 
explored new media’s role in internal state security by examining power 
differentials between the individual and the state when ICT is utilized, the third 
chapter will focus on the relationship between violent non-state actors’ (VNSA) 
Internet usage as they operate in opposition to the formal nation state system, 
otherwise known as an extrastate conflict.  
An evaluation of all transnational groups’ nefarious behavior as empowered 
by ICT is too expansive a topic for this paper; instead this chapter will focus on new 
media’s impact on the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
terrorism threat. Specifically, this chapter seeks to understand why the al-Qaeda 
network, despite their committed desire and increased access to information on 
weapons of mass destruction via the Internet, failed to successfully conduct a single 
CBRN attack against the United States or its allies in the last decade as predicated by 
many academic experts and policy makers.   
This thesis chapter will test the notional theory that the threat of CBRN 
terrorism has increased due to the increasingly free flow of information on weapons 
of mass destruction by presenting an empirical analysis of CBRN datasets.  This 
                                                          




paper uses al-Qaeda’s unconventional weapons program as a case study to evaluate 
the phenomenon of ICT and its empowerment of non-state actors. By evaluating 
prior empirical findings and by presenting new data analysis on CBRN terrorism, 
this chapter will analyze the present state of al-Qaeda and other jihadists’ efforts to 
accomplish their stated goals of fashioning devices with sufficient lethality to kill 
millions of Americans, while also seeking to contextualize the significance of new 
media as a tool that increases motivations and capabilities.  
Literature Review 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11), many leading 
thinkers in the counterterrorism community predicted it would be only a matter of 
time before a VNSA would successfully attack the United States with a CBRN 
weapon. In fact, in June 2003 the U.S. government issued a report assessing a “high 
probability” that al-Qaeda would conduct a weapon of mass destruction attack 
within the following two years.274 One of the principal arguments promulgated by 
security experts after 9/11 was that VNSAs could easily acquire the information on 
the Internet to build a crude weapon, such as an improvised nuclear device, and 
detonate it against the United States or its interests abroad. Yet, extremist groups 
like al-Qaeda have failed to conduct such attacks despite their well-publicized 
ambitions. 
The lack of a mass-casualty post-9/11 terrorist attacks on the American 
homeland aside, historically CBRN events are a rarity. On average, CBRN terrorist 
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attacks are half as lethal as conventional terrorist attacks,275 and prior to 9/11, no 
single conventional terrorist attack killed more than 500 people.276 In the twentieth 
century, only fourteen terrorist events have killed more than 100 people, and all of 
those events used conventional modes.277 Despite the fatality disparity between 
conventional and unconventional weapons outcomes, the fact remains that 
successful deployment of a CBRN device could precipitate “mass panic and large-
scale economic disruption” that goes beyond the number of causalities associated 
with the attack.278 Accordingly, if new media aids al-Qaeda and likeminded groups 
in the fabrication of CBRN capabilities, as some have postulated, then careful study 
is warranted.   
Defining WMD 
In discussing CBRN weapons and how one might use new media to acquire 
the information for building a crude device, some technical parameters must be 
established.  
Only one weapon type, nuclear, poses an existential threat to a state and is therefore 
classified as a weapon of mass destruction. Chemical, biological and radiological 
weapons are more accurately characterized as Weapons of Mass Disruption 
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(WMD).279 280 281 This is because nuclear weapons are the only CBRN type capable 
of creating a destructive mass-casualty scenario, whereas chemical, biological, and 
radiological devices are unlikely to produce multitudinous deaths due to significant 
weaponization and dispersal limitations, especially when employed by a non-state 
entity.282   
Conversely, a “dirty bomb,” better classified as a radiological dispersion 
device (RDD), would not produce mass casualties since the radiological sources 
available to VNSAs do not contain enough radioactive material to cause significant 
harm.283 Persons in proximity to an RDD explosion are more likely to die from the 
blast effects than from exposure to the dispersed radioisotopes. In addition, highly 
radioactive sources, such as gamma emitters, are very difficult to handle and 
exposure to the ionizing radiation during creation of the RDD could be lethal.284 
Figure 3.A contains a computer simulation model of the hypothetical blast 
radius from a crude 100 ton nuclear device employed by a terrorist. This simulation 
shows that nuclear device detonated at Dupont Circe in Washington, D.C. under 
clear atmospheric conditions would have lethal radiation radius (colored green) 
stretching from Rock Creek Parkway to 16th Street Northwest, encompassing the 
Johns Hopkins D.C. campus, approximately three-quarters of one mile in 
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diameter.285 Using the Nuclear Weapons Archive’s estimation for short-term 
fatalities by counting every person in the 5 psi blast overpressure contour around 
the hypocenter, a 100 ton nuclear detonation in Dupont Circle could kill 
approximately 17,600 people.286 287 Contrast Figure 3.A’s mortality estimates to 
those from the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo’s March 20, 1995 chemical 
weapons (CW) attack on the Tokyo subway: using liquid sarin (a nerve agent) in 
plastic bags, Aum cult members punctured the bags with sharpened umbrella tips, 
releasing liquid and fumes that killed 13 people and sent 6,000 to the hospital with 
injuries, many psychological.288  
Figure 3.A – Hypothetical Blast Radius of a Crude Nuclear Weapon in 
Washington, D.C. 289 
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The Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack is one of the most successful uses of CW by 
any VNSA in history, but resulted in relatively few deaths. Aum Shinrikyo had 
capabilities and advantages that gave it access to chemicals and agents, production 
facilities, testing venues, and free range of movement, of which most post-9/11 
apocalyptic groups do not have at their disposal. This included highly skilled 
members, plenty of money, relative freedom of movement, and multiple disguised 
factories for mass production of agents. A United Nations report estimated that one 
of Aum’s production facilities, the Satyan 7 building, and its contents cost $30 
million.290 Chemical, biological and radiological weapons pale in lethality compared 
to the potential catastrophic devastation of a successfully deployed nuclear device. 
Experts on CBRN Terrorism 
The study of CBRN terrorism as a separate phenomenon from conventional 
attacks is an important part of the literature on terrorism research, even though 
these types of attacks have been comparatively rare. “The single most important 
national security threat we face is nuclear weapons falling into the hands of 
terrorists,” proclaimed then-Presidential candidate Barak Obama in a campaign 
video from 2008.291  According to prominent terrorism expert Gary Ackerman, a 
successful detonation of a CBRN device could yield “inordinate psychological and 
social impact,” as well as onerous cleanup costs, long-term property damage, loss of 
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commerce, and more importantly the catastrophic loss of life from a nuclear 
weapon.292 293  
As such, it is reasonable to be alarmed by al-Qaeda and other extremist 
groups’ spread of technical manuals offering advice on creating CBRN devices as 
well as the religious justification to use them. New media mogul Tina Brown 
lamented that the “conjunction of 21st-century Internet speed and 12th-century 
fanaticism has turned our world into a tinderbox.”294 Moreover, terrorism experts 
since 9/11 have routinely viewed new media’s dissemination of information on 
CBRN weaponization as one of the casual factors related to the alleged increased 
WMD terrorism threat. 295 296 These experts contend that ICT’s pervasive spread of 
knowledge on CBRN is problematic, especially when coupled with the globalization 
of Internet commerce, which allows amateur scientists to purchase Do-It-Yourself 
labs and tinker with dangerous dual-use technologies.297 298  
While the “diffusion of knowledge” on unconventional weapons via the 
Internet is disquieting, respected terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman detailed in his 
2002 Congressional testimony that it was the Internet’s rapid spread of radical 
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ideology that was far more deleterious.  “As one U.S. government observer of the 
terrorism Internet phenomenon has noted in the context of the radical Islamic web 
sites, ‘never in history has there been an opportunity where propaganda is so 
effective.’ ” 299 300 New media could also theoretically drive groups like a-Qaeda to 
pursue CBRN proficiency, since terrorists may feel the need to “raise the bar” by 
executing attacks even more spectacular than 9/11, thus garnering greater attention 
to their raison d’être.301 
 The fear over CBRN terrorism has saturated the public as well. Brian 
Jenkins’s Congressional testimony from his 2008 book, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” 
cites public opinion polls showing that 40% of Americans believe that a nuclear 
terrorist event would happen by 2013. This contrasts starkly with one European 
nuclear scientist’s estimate of the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack at 1%.302 
The reason for the vast discrepancies between what elected officials and the 
populace purport as an imminent threat, and nuclear scientists assess to be only 
marginal, is the lack of sophisticated statistical analysis against salient CBRN data, 
according to Ackerman.303 After a review of 120 scholarly works on CBRN 
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terrorism, Ackerman concluded that CBRN threat assessments were largely based 
on “anecdotal evidence provided by a handful of prominent cases.”304 
Other security experts assess that 9/11 was an outlier event and since a 
CBRN terror event is even less likely to occur, they see little value in the 
consternation over al-Qaeda’s WMD attempts.305 Leading bioterror pessimist Milton 
Leitenburg points out the technical challenges in carrying out CBRN attacks, noting 
that “bioterrorism killed no U.S citizens in the twentieth century and five to date in 
the twenty-first century,” a reference to the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. 306 Still 
other experts contend that there are sometimes greater incentives for groups not to 
pursue WMD capabilities since actually detonating such weapons could result in a 
group losing support and funding from their targeted constituencies. Such attacks 
could also invite a massive retaliatory response by the aggrieved state, which could 
destroy the VNSA or the host country, akin to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after 
9/11.307 308  
Evaluation of Prior Empirical Research 
In the field of CBRN terrorism study, three prominent empirical studies309 
quantitatively test the hypothesized casual factors of VNSA pursuit of CBRN against 
the Monterey Institutes’ Weapons of Mass Destruction database (hereafter 
Monterey WMD database), which documents all open-source CBRN incidents and is 
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one of the most respected datasets in the field of WMD research.  These studies 
include Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler’s 2006 and 2007 research “CBRN Incidents: 
Political Regimes, Perpetrators, and Targets” and “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An 
Empirical Study,” respectively. The third is “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist 
Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism” by Gary Ackerman, 
Victor Asal, and R. Karl Rethemeyer.  Of note, Ackerman, Asal and Rethemeyer’s 
research slightly deviates by merging the Monterey WMD database with datasets 
from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in their 
statistical analysis.   
Of the three research analyses, only Ackerman and his colleagues test CBRN 
terrorism incidents against technological and communications development in the 
VNSA’s host nations. Despite the claims from policy makers, academics, and elected 
officials that the dissemination of CBRN knowledge will lead to more attacks, the 
other two studies do not test new media theories as it relates to casual factors in 
VNSA use of CBRN.  Ivanova and Sandler’s studies lightly reference a greater 
“knowledge base” in democracies, but that is in regards to the increased access to 
skilled technical experts and universities in democracies, not ICT.310 
The Ackerman study uses quantitative methods to evaluate CBRN incidents 
and VNSA organizational data from 1998 to 2005, whereas the Ivanova and Sandler 
studies query similar datasets from 1988 to 2004 due to the rarity of CBRN attacks 
before 1988, resulting in limited variation in CBRN events to explain using 
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inferential statistics.311 Ivanova and Sandler’s 2007 research reveals that per 
incident, chemical agent use or acquisition by a VNSA is by far the most the most 
prevalent, followed by biological, radiological, and nuclear attempts. The authors 
note that the eight documented VNSA nuclear attempts involved al-Qaeda’s efforts 
to acquire enriched uranium with hopes of developing a crude nuclear device, and 
Chechen rebels’ efforts to procure a “suitcase bomb” from ex-Soviet facilities.312 
None of those attempts were successful, according to available open source 
literature. As noted in the above, the use of the Monterey WMD database starting in 
1988 was because of the exponential increase in VNSA use and procurement 
incidents after 1988; however, the study does not provide any explanation as to why 
there was such an increase after the late 1980s. 
Of the 12 hypotheses presented in the Ackerman study, this paper is most 
concerned with hypothesis number two: “The higher the level of technological 
development (as proxied by energy consumption) in the organization’s host 
country, the greater the likelihood of pursuing a CBRN capability.”313 The authors 
postulate that it is not just access to the Internet, but the ability to collaborate with 
technical experts from universities, as well as the proliferation of dual-use 
technologies, which inform VNSA awareness of the potential for WMD. They argue 
that CBRN knowledge must be merged with substantive institutions since 
sophisticated understanding of physics, biology and chemistry is necessary for 
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weaponization of selected agents. Therefore, integration of the terrorist 
organization’s home country into the global economy through trade is an essential 
factor for the terrorist CBRN threat.314 
Of note, the scope of the Ackerman study is defined by exploring the 
motivations of groups who decide to pursue CBRN. Therefore, hypothesis two is 
framed by how technological development in the host country may impact VNSA 
desires to pursue CBRN capabilities.  The researchers ran 395 observations of 
organizations’ attempts to acquire or actual usage of CBRN from 1998 to 2005 
against the United Nations’ Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
information and communication index, and 312 observations against the UNCTAD’s 
technology development index.  Ackerman and his colleagues found no correlation 
between the host country’s technology development and CBRN terrorism incidents.  
Neither of the UNCTAD’s indexes showed any “statistically significant predictors of 
CBRN pursuit or use.” 315 However, the authors assume that the defeat of their 
hypothesis may be due to ICT data being immersed in the “economic embeddedness 
effect,” which is their hypothesis that a host country’s integration into the global 
economy makes a VNSA more likely to pursue CBRN weapons, a theory that was 
consistent across the Ackerman team’s models.316  
While the authors’ assumption of ICT availability for countries with economic 
interdependence may appear on the surface to be reasonable, it is not an 
assumption that can be taken for granted. Many countries engage in international 
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trade while limiting Internet access. Indeed, many countries in which al-Qaeda is 
strongest are led by authoritarian regimes that engage economically with 
international partners while seeking to limit public access to ICT and freedom of 
use.   
Data Results 
 To ascertain whether information diffusion via ICT has had a demonstrable 
effect on CBRN incidents by VNSAs, this paper applies the Monterey WMB database 
to the United Nations’ International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data on global 
Internet penetration.317 All CBRN incidents labeled as a hoax or prank were culled 
from the data. However, unlike the earlier studies previously referenced, all other 
acquisition categories were retained in the dataset including those events labeled as 
“use of agent”, “attempted acquisition”, “threat with possession”, “threat only”, “plot 
only”, “possession only”, and “unknown.”318 This study incorporates all non-state 
actor cases, including those tied to criminal networks, since the line between 
criminality and terrorism is often blurred. For example, criminal syndicates are 
often intertwined with terrorist organizations in places like Afghanistan and 
Somalia, where narcotics traffickers and pirates have lent direct financial support 
and facilitation of weapons to VNSAs.319 320  Additionally, “threats only” and “plots 
only” incidents where agent possession was not publicly substantiated were also 
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retained, since this paper is concerned not only with how new media might aid in 
technical knowledge for weapons fabrication, but also if the Internet’s diffusion of 
propaganda persuades more groups to seek a WMD capability.  
 Figure 3.B provides an annual visualization of all CBRN incidents from 1990 
to 2012, and Figure 3.C compares the same total incident data with the global 
Internet penetration statistics as documented by the ITU. The date parameters were 
selected because very few CBRN cases were documented prior to 1990, and the 
Internet was virtually nonexistent prior to this date, rendering the earlier time 
frames statistically irrelevant.  Furthermore, the latter dates coincide with the rise 
of global ICT usage, which allows for a more relevant comparison with the Internet 
saturation rates. 
Figure 3.B – Threats, Attempted Acquisition, and Usage of CBRN Weapons 321 
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As observed in Figure 3.C, the total CBRN linear trend line is slightly 
decreasing over the time plotted, but is probably more prudently classified as flat 
due to the small-n sample size of the available data. As global Internet users 
continue a steep upward trend, the data does not show a long-term correlation 
between CBRN incidents and Internet usage. CBRN incidents rose in the late-1990s 
before falling in the late 2000s.  
Figure 3.C – Comparison of CBRN incidents versus Global Internet 
Penetration322 323 
 
More importantly, the number of attempted nuclear incidents has remained 
negligible, with the exception of a small spike in 2000-2001. Since all four variables 
experienced their highest event rates in the late 1990s and early 2000s, one could 
hypothesize that apocalyptic VNSAs seeking CBRN weapons may have used ICT to 
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gain access to greater amounts of information on WMD technologies or radical 
propaganda encouraging CBRN, than was previously at their disposal. Therefore, 
their newfound awareness increased the attempted acquisitions and uses.  
This conclusion is open for criticism since the Monterey WMB database, like 
all other open source datasets on CBRN terrorism, is reliant on partial information 
reported by news organizations, academic studies, or government reports. It could 
be that the increase in communication technologies biased the data, since 
theoretically more incidents could be reported than was previously possible.  
However, this critique does not explain the substantial decrease of events for all 
variables post 2008, with the subsequent return to early 1990s CBRN incidents 
levels.   
The data does not lend itself readily to determinations of causality. However, 
it does not appear the reason for the reduction in CBRN events is tied to a VNSA 
decision to cease pursuit of such weapons. Further, following 9/11, governments 
adopted significantly more robust counter-terrorism policies and increased ICT 
monitoring, in essence using the Internet as a tool against VNSAs. These efforts may 
have undermined the range of VNSA plans, including CBRN attack plots. If this is the 
case, it would indicate that availability of ICT is a secondary factor in determining 
the likelihood of VNSAs successfully executing CBRN attacks; the strength of global 
counter-terrorism efforts appear more relevant, as this factor will determine the 




Case Study: Al-Qaeda and WMD 
The paucity of open source data available on VNSA acquisitions makes it 
nearly impossible to do purely empirical analysis due to the absence of any real 
WMD attacks.324 325 Forecasting human behavior is always challenging, but 
imperfect datasets provide an important opening for thoughtful consideration of 
noteworthy CBRN case studies. Publicly-available sources, detainee reports, media 
documents, press interviews, and a large body of circumstantial evidence clearly 
indicate that al-Qaeda was just as committed to manufacturing a WMD program as it 
was to executing the 9/11 attacks.326  
Al-Qaeda leaders colluded with corrupt states and its Islamist allies over four 
continents for a decade to systematically procure the knowledge and materiel 
necessary to create a WMD program with emphasis on nuclear and biological 
weapons.327 328 Osama bin Laden’s vision for the potential devastation of CBRN 
weapons combined with deputy Ayman al- Zawahiri’s programmatic administration 
to propel al-Qaeda forward in its pursuits. Pivotal to those efforts was al-Qaeda’s use 
of ICT to propagate the religious justification to conduct said attacks, to gather 
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knowledge on WMD, communicate with technical experts, coordinate attack 
planning, and provide virtual training to would-be jihadists.329 330  
Al-Qaeda’s early adaptation of new media tools certainly bestowed an 
advantage over less tech savvy jihadi groups. However, it seems clear that other 
factors such as a supportive host nation, freedom of movement, access to skilled 
technicians, and plentiful financial resources were ultimately more important for 
CBRN acquisition than the benefits the Internet afforded. Ironically, after 9/11, the 
Internet is what saved the group from extinction, allowing bin Laden’s fantasy of a 
significant CBRN attack against the United States to survive as a threat, albeit a far 
less substantial one.  
Brief History 
Al-Qaeda’s WMD machinations reach back 20 years: the operatives under the 
leadership of Ramzi Yousef conducted the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) 
bombing had attempted to incorporate sodium cyanide into their homemade bomb 
to generate deadly hydrogen cyanide gas, which could have resulted in a much 
larger death toll.331 The judge in Yousef’s case stated on the record that the sodium 
cyanide burned in the blast rather than vaporizing to make hydrogen cyanide. There 
appears to be some contention around this issue, as then a senior research associate 
with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, John Parachini, thoroughly examined 
the public court documents on the first WTC bombings and concluded that the WTC 
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bombers did not use a chemical poison, but only considered it as an option.332 Of 
course, there is the possibility that the sealed findings, which the judge was privy to, 
offered evidence not in the public record.333 Further, it seems unlikely that the judge 
would have fabricated the evidence he cited, lending credence to the assertion that 
the WTC bombers attempted to use a chemical device. 
The actual first confirmation of bin Laden’s desire to procure CBRN weapons 
came in late 1993 when al-Qaeda allegedly purchased uranium in Sudan for $1.5 
million possibly with help from former Sudanese President Saleh Mobruk, according 
to the testimony of a FBI informant.334 After the 1998 merger of Zawahiri’s Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad with al-Qaeda, Zawahiri oversaw the strategic biological and nuclear 
weapons procurement processes. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, al-Qaeda 
endeavored to obtain CBRN weapons through “parallel paths” via multiple network 
nodes.335 Moving independently, each unit adhered to tight compartmentalization 
and reported directly to al-Qaeda leaders regarding its progress to buy, steal, or 
manufacture WMD.336 This strict command and control of weapons acquisition was 
thwarted after the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, which scattered the 
leadership and destroyed its ability to function in the smooth hierarchical fashion as 
it once had.  This supports the assertion that while ICT have facilitated VNSA 
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attempts to procure CBRN, it remains a secondary factor in comparison to the 
efforts of state counter-terrorism programs. 
Weapons on the Web  
Rather than directly facilitating VNSA pursuit of CBRN, ICT appears far more 
relevant in enabling VNSA survival by facilitating propaganda. As VNSAs like al-
Qaeda continue to harbor the same aspirations for mass casualty attacks, ICT’s 
primary contribution is in enabling the survival of an ideology that might otherwise 
have been extinguished. Professor Bruce Hoffman described how al-Qaeda even 
before 9/11 placed an emphasis on external communications by recruiting Egyptian 
computer experts to create an extensive network of websites and e-mail capabilities 
that continue to function today despite the group’s ouster from Afghanistan.337 
Hoffman contends that al-Qaeda early on uniquely understood the value of new 
media, and after it was forced to flee its sanctuary after 9/11, group members 
utilized the Internet as a “virtual sanctuary” for propaganda, fundraising, terrorist 
instructional training, and operational planning through email correspondence and 
web forums.338 
Of the estimated 4,600 radical Islamist websites as of 2006, only a fraction 
deals with CRBN terrorism.339 As Figure 3D demonstrates, al-Qaeda was actively 
using new media technologies to gather technical details on WMD and potential 
targets, while also using those same tools to disseminate to jihadi sympathizers the 
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knowledge gained on how to conduct an asymmetrical attack. It is difficult to know 
how many al-Qaeda acolytes and self-radicalizers have viewed their CBRN 
instructional documents, but according to a Sunday Times report, when al-Qaeda’s 
Nuclear Preparation Encyclopedia went live on al-Fardaws’ website in October 2005 
it drew over 57,000 visitors.340 
Figure 3.D – Timeline of Al-Qaeda’s (AQ) CBRN Activities341 342 343 
1998:  (First reported in 2001) A reporter  
purchases computers from Afghan looters that  
contain Zawahiri’s CBW program and ops plans, 
codenamed “Curdled Milk”. 
 
Before Nov. 2001:  In Aug 2002, CNN 
releases AQ’s own video tapes showing dog 
killed by an unidentified toxin, possibly 
crude nerve agent or hydrogen cyanide. 
 
Nov. 2001:  A search of an NGO’s Kabul office  
which directly aided AQ’s WMD program reveals  
documents with internet searches on CBRN. 
 
Jan 2002:  AQ safe house raided in Kabul 
has computer software of US dams, and 
magazines with US nuclear power plants; 
also rudimentary designs for a nuke. 
 
 
June 2002:  11th volume of AQ’s Encyclopedia of Jihad 
is devoted to the construction of CBW and available 
on the internet.  
2004:  AQ manifesto posted on the Internet 
by Abu Hajir calls for use of nuke & bio 
weapons against Saudi government. 
 
Oct 2005: Jihadi website releases the Nuclear 
Preparation Encyclopedia with detailed instructions 
on CBW agents and nuclear weapons.   
Oct 2005-2006: Two prominent jihadi 
websites post manuals to build a crude 
hydrogen cyanide dispersal device; AQ may 
have planned to use the device.  
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21st Century Propaganda  
 Beyond technical manuals, traditional media outlets and new media venues 
were key to al-Qaeda’s efforts to propagate the religious justification for the killing 
of noncombatants by unorthodox methods. As Professor Gabriel Weimann explains, 
in 1998, less than half of the groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs) had a website; but, by the close of 1999 almost every single group had its 
own website.344 345  
On February 23, 1998, bin Laden issued his famous fatwa against the United 
States, implicitly implying an Islamic duty to deploy WMD.346 “The ruling to kill the 
American and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every 
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do.”347 In 1999 he 
proclaimed, “Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.”348 
Bin Laden’s radical statements were rapidly transmitted across the Internet, and 
also disseminated through wire service reports and by major news outlets. His 
propaganda was not limited to the written word; in every year after 9/11 until his 
death at the hands of U.S. Navy SEALs in May 2011, bin Laden released online videos 
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via the websites managed by al-Qaeda’s media arm and to the Arabic news channel 
Al-Jazeera.  
 Al-Qaeda also employed authoritative religious surrogates to disseminate 
propaganda. In May 2003, extremist Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd wrote a 26-page 
fatwa entitled “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Against Infidels”, which was endorsed by another extreme cleric Ali al-Khudair, a 
leading religious promoter of al-Qaeda.349 Al-Fahd’s fatwa blessed the use of WMD 
against infidels like Americans, but also argued the killing of fellow Muslims was 
permitted when one was called to Jihad. 350 351 Nasir al-Fahd would later recant his 
statements in a video after his arrest by the Saudi Arabian security services. 352 Ali 
al-Khudair was also arrested in the same crackdown; Saudi authorities alleged al-
Khudair advocated violence in his sermons and on the Internet. He too renounced 
violence, and the Saudi government claimed neither cleric was coerced.353 
After 9/11, the United States’ intense manhunt for al-Qaeda leadership 
fractured the group and forced it to rely on local network leaders to operationalize 
plots. As the pressure against these high value targets increased throughout the 
2000s, al-Qaeda became even more dependent on surrogates and affiliate 
enterprises via new media platforms to spread violent messages in the hopes of 
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inciting homegrown terrorists into action.  In 2010, al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), a regional franchise of al-Qaeda, released a web-accessed, English 
language magazine, Inspire.  Since the original publication, in at least two of the 
online Inspire editions, the magazine’s authors have called for would-be jihadists 
“with microbiology and chemistry degrees to develop biological or chemical toxins 
such as botulism, ricin, or cyanide,” reflecting al-Qaeda’s continued interest in 
pursuing a CBRN attack354  
After the death of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Anwar al-
Awlaki by United States forces in September 2011, Inspire edition VIII featured an 
article from the deceased al-Awlaki, in which he posthumously cited six Islamic 
scholars to argue that the killing of civilians by chemical and biological weapons is 
permissible in Islam: “The use of poisons or chemical and biological weapons 
against population centers is allowed and is strongly recommended due to its great 
effect on the enemy.”355 Neither edition appears to give instructions for making 
CBRN devices, but they offer an urgent call to arms and proclaim the onus is on 
Muslim American to attack the United States. Of note, it is alleged that the 2013 
Boston Marathon bombers used an Inspire recipe for pressure cooker bombs to 
build the devices they detonated in the marathon terrorist attack. The article, which 
appeared in the first edition of Inspire, was entitled "How to Make a Bomb in the 
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Kitchen of Your Mom.”356 Nevertheless, it is as yet unclear whether the manuals for 
producing far more complex CBRN weapons would allow an individual with little to 
no scientific background to build a device capable of a mass casualty attack. 
Despite the deaths of bin Laden and al-Awlaki, the Internet has kept their 
extremist rhetoric alive. While still a low probability event, it is troubling that a self-
radicalized “lone wolf” actor with specialized expertise, access to agents, and intent 
to harm could fashion a CBRN device capable of inflicting serious damage.  Today, al-
Qaeda and its affiliates’ quest to kill Americans with both conventional and 
unconventional terrorist acts has not diminished, while their tactics to prosecute 
such attacks has evolved due to steady and severe pressure from international 
counterterrorism efforts. Al-Qaeda is more than ever dependent on new media for 
survival of the network.  
Failed WMD States 
Thus far, this paper posited that there is no evident correlation between 
rising Internet users and CBRN attempted acquisition or usage; a rejection of the 
notional theory that diffusion of knowledge would equate to more incidents. The 
debate over whether or not new media is empowering terrorist groups to achieve 
their WMD ambitions could soon be moot. In Syria, the world is witnessing the 
failure of a state with the region’s most expansive CW program; and nuclear-armed 
Pakistan appears to be trending towards greater instability, and also remains a 
proliferation threat.  
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Writing in 2009, James Forest and Sammy Salama contended, “…one should 
not discount the possibility that in the future jihadi operatives will acquire access to 
CBRN agents or even ready-made weapons if favorable political circumstances arise 
that facilitate such transfers or theft.”357 The religious justification for WMD use 
propagated via the Internet could mean that CBRN terrorism among Sunni 
extremists has become accepted normative behavior.  If so, al-Qaeda and their 
affiliates in Syria or Pakistan would not likely hesitate to use such a device if 
procured.  
Syria: Al-Qaeda’s Access Point for CW? 
According to the British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 
“Syria has the largest CW arsenal in the Middle East and likely the fourth-largest in 
the world…it has been assessed that Syria has developed and stockpiled hundreds of 
tons of chemical weapons.”358 CBRN terrorism experts like Professor Charles Blair 
assess that “Syria may also possess an offensive biological weapons capability.”359 In 
addition to the precarious situation of the Assad regime using chemical weapons 
against civilians, there is the compounding possibility that the Syrian rebels could 
overtake the regime and some of the lethal agents in the Syrian stockpile could end 
up in the hands of terrorists that have infiltrated the rebel forces, including al-Qaeda 
affiliates.360 If successful, terrorists could potentially have access to the lethal 
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amounts of nerve agents including sarin and VX, as well as mustard gas, a blistering 
agent.361  
The Syrian civil war is not only an internal issue; regional players such as 
majority Sunni states like Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have sided with the 
rebels, while predominately Shi’a states like Iran and Iraq are in line with the Assad 
regime.362 Aram Nerguizian from the Washington think tank the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies explains the looming regional crisis:  "What gets lost in all 
the talk of Syria…is that it's located at the very epicenter of inter-Arab and Arab-
Israeli politics.”363 The problem with the Sunni states’ support to the rebels is that 
they are far less judicious with which actors receive weapons. Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar have sent lethal aid shipments to Jabhat al-Nusra, a Salafist group that has 
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making it the most well armed opposition group 
active in Syria.364 365 Other regional actors with a history of supporting radical 
Islamic actors have enabled the extremist factions in the opposition to militarily 
dominate secular fighters.  
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Pakistan: Ticking (Nuclear) Time Bomb  
Pakistan is the primary source of the nuclear terrorism threat as it hosts al-
Qaeda’s senior leadership, al-Qaeda sympathizers with nuclear expertise.366 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons that are not always handled with high security methods: 
according to both Pakistani and American sources, the Pakistan military chooses to 
regularly move mated nuclear weapons in modestly defended vehicles on congested 
public roads between multiple nuclear facilities to “keep American and Indian 
intelligence agencies guessing about their locations.”367 Given the presence of al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, their historical nuclear weapons acquisition attempts,368 and a 
history of penetrating the Pakistani security services,369 370 this vulnerability raises 
the risk level that al-Qaeda or one its alliance partners could steal a nuclear 
weapons, despite the difficulties associated with executing such an operation. 
Pakistan and Afghanistan were key for al-Qaeda when they actively sought 
the capabilities to produce an improvised nuclear device. Prior to the 9/11 attacks 
on New York and Washington, al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban officials met with two 
former Pakistani nuclear scientists in a unified effort to procure nuclear weapons.371 
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In a U.S.-Russian joint threat assessment on nuclear terrorism, experts explained al-
Qaeda’s motives and historical actions:   
“Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades. The group 
has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear 
weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise. Al -
Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear 
program in the desert in Afghanistan. The group’s nuclear ambitions 
continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaida leadership are focused on 
justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of 
mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal 
religious justification for nuclear use.” 372 
 
In considering how a VNSA would create an improvised nuclear device, 
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier explain that “it is worth noting that the chemistry 
involved in converting opium poppies to heroin…is probably roughly as complex as 
the chemistry required to separate uranium from research reactor fuel.373 Of course, 
bin Laden’s former Afghan hosts, the Taliban, are deeply intertwined in the illicit 
narcotics cultivation and trade in Afghanistan and are well-versed in opium 
conversion process.374 
Conclusion 
CBRN terrorism is often thought of as a post-modern, post-9/11 challenge, 
but in reality these security concerns are more than 60 years old. In 1946, 
theoretical physicists and Manhattan Project member J. Robert Oppenheimer, also 
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known as the father of the atom bomb, was reportedly distressed over a scenario 
where a few men could smuggle a nuclear weapon into New York City and detonate 
it without warning.375 With other modern security matters in mind, this chapter 
tested whether ICT’s diffusion of CBRN information had increased the probability 
that VNSAs would acquire and deploy a WMD device.  
The empirical research confirms there is no evident correlation between 
rising Internet usage and CBRN attempted acquisition or deployment, a rejection of 
the original theory. This most likely indicates that availability of ICT is a secondary 
factor in determining the likelihood of VNSAs successfully executing CBRN attacks; 
the variables of primary importance include a permissive operating environment, 
freedom of movement, and direct access to skilled technicians. In this chapter, 
theory and probability were confronted by reality in that a terrorist group’s 
increased access to knowledge on the Internet did not enable it to overcome the 
extent challenges of acquisition and deployment.  
Retrospectively, the United States government’s efforts to curb acts of 
conventional terrorism have also curbed CBRN terrorism to a degree that far 
outweighs any information advantage provided by VNSA access to information 
through ICT. However, the survival of al-Qaeda and its ideology in the face of 
tremendous expenditures of military, political, and economic power by the United 
States and its allies is a testament to the utility of ICT as a propaganda tool. Thus, 
insofar as those groups maintain their objective to use CBRN against civilians, ICT 
functions by enabling terrorists to maintain the threat of CBRN use.  
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Furthermore, the al-Qaeda case study revealed it remains plausible that ICT 
could enable one or more VNSAs to radicalize individuals who have already received 
the special training to develop or deploy CBRN, much like the Pakistani nuclear 
scientists in the late 1990s. Al-Qaeda’s religious justification for WMD use 
propagated in Internet videos and in Web-based magazines may mean that CBRN 
terrorism among Sunni extremists is accepted as justifiable. If this is the case, VNSAs 
will require a nexus between their successful radicalization of skilled individuals, 
along with a failed state that has stockpiles of such weapons; as discussed, state 
collapses in Syria or Pakistan offer plausible scenarios where this nexus exists. 
While the findings in this chapter reinforce the hypothesis that this is a very low 
probability event and the data does not show an increase in such attempts, policy 
makers and security practitioners must be vigilant against jihadi sympathizers 
working in advanced sciences who could self-radicalize and use their access to 
conduct lone-wolf style attacks.     
 
 




It is quite remarkable how ICT has transformed commerce, global 
communications, and societal interactions so dramatically in only twenty years 
since the modern Internet became widely accessible to individuals. As a result, all 
states are presented with unprecedented security vulnerabilities, and their 
response to shifting power differentials is paramount. This has led many analysts to 
proclaim that power differentials have fundamentally changed and that cyberspace 
ultimately will render other forms of warfare irrelevant. However, the Internet has 
neither fundamentally altered human nature nor the desires and competitions that 
fuel conflict; it is transforming the experience of conflict, although not necessarily 
the outcomes.  
This thesis has found no conclusive data to support the notion that ICT is 
concurrently revolutionizing interstate, intrastate or extrastate conflict to the point 
whereby a weaker adversary can achieve a desired political outcome through the 
unique use of cyberspace.  If this were the case, one would expect to see VNSAs, 
dissident movements, and fragile states solely using the Internet to prevail against 
their more powerful adversaries. At present there are no such cases. To the 
contrary, dominant nation states (especially authoritarians) have used ICT in 
concert with traditional security forces to defeat those who challenge the normal 
order. The prediction that the fifth domain will make other forms of warfare 
irrelevant, or that the Internet provides a competitive advantage for dissidents and 
terrorists, has not yet come to fruition.  
104 
 
While cyberspace adds a new virtual dimension to conflict, much like 
airpower added a third dimension to military conflict after World War I, cyber 
weapons have not yet developed to the point where they can replace weaponry in 
the physical domains.  Some experts argue that they never will. To extend the air 
power analogy further, aerial systems first provided unparalleled reconnaissance 
capabilities before evolving into their more famous roles delivering deadly 
payloads.  Today, cyber weapons are significantly limited and cyber warfare has not 
proven to be an adequate substitute for an air force, let alone an occupying force.  
Although as technology advances, cyber weapons could transform from auxiliary to 
decisive in combat, much like airpower. Alternatively, cyber warfare could be 
relegated to a category similar to chemical warfare: it inspires serious concerns, but 
has not affected the global balance of power. The latter appears more likely because 
of the Internet’s inherent limitations in affecting the physical world.  
Like all research products, this thesis is open to criticism due to the rapid 
pace of technological change; future events could overcome the relevance of these 
case studies, and new data could challenge the empirical findings. In chapter one, 
the cyber warfare case studies represent the use of Internet weapons by an already 
more powerful state, which leaves open the question of whether one can use these 
cases to draw firm conclusions on state power differentials. However, the other 
available case studies lack the documentation necessary to make them worthwhile 
subjects, or they do not rise to the level of warfare, which was a necessary condition 
for proper evaluation. Future studies of cyber warfare involving smaller states 
105 
 
against larger ones, or states at power parity, should be judged against the Cohen 
model for a more comprehensive assessment. 
 The Iranian case study in chapter two was completed in the fall of 2010, 
before the Arab Spring. While this author contends that the findings in this thesis 
chapter on Iran are still relevant to the Arab Spring, more detailed research is 
necessary, specifically on countries like Egypt (with a longstanding national identity 
and a robust security apparatus) as well as weaker countries, like Tunisia. Also, one 
could argue that while the 2009 Green Movement protests did not lead to 
revolutionary change, the ensuing conflict between protesters and the security 
forces critically undermined the regime’s credibility and may have paved the way 
for the 2013 election of a Presidential reformer, Hassan Rouhani. This could speak 
volumes about the Internet’s efficacy as a tool for reform, vice revolution. More 
observation is essential since Rouhani’s election is not yet distinct from the 1997 
election of ineffectual Iranian reformist Mohammad Khatami.  
The conclusions drawn from the empirical research in chapter three are 
subject to critique since the Monterey WMD database, like all other open source 
datasets on CBRN terrorism, is reliant on partial information reported by news 
organizations, academic studies, or public government reports. To that end, CBRN 
terrorism incidents are also statistically insignificant events when compared to the 
large amount of conventional terrorism incidents, thus making the data difficult to 
acquire and then assess. The dearth of public information also limits case studies 
available for examination, but the post-9/11 media attention on al-Qaeda’s WMD 
ambitions proved especially useful for augmenting the literature in chapter three.   
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 The findings in this thesis have implications for how military strategists 
prepare for war, how diplomats engage and support like-minded groups, and how 
policymakers allocate funds for Defense and Homeland Security. Strategists should 
move quickly to build an international consensus around a definition of cyber war, 
vice cyber espionage or cybercrime, and establish clearly defined red lines for the 
military’s use of the Internet in war. These actions will most likely increase 
predictability and avoid unintended military escalation.  
Diplomats should understand the strengths and weaknesses of new media, 
and not rely on ICT as a panacea when engaging friendly foreign movements. More 
importantly, democratic states must actively encourage and cultivate open Internet 
policies in world forums, whenever possible. If ICT is a secondary factor in 
determining the likelihood of VNSAs successfully executing CBRN attacks, then 
policy makers should invest more resources in conventional post-9/11 
counterterrorism measures to curb all methods of terrorism. Specifically, bioterror 
programs at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with multi-billion dollar 
price tags should be thoroughly reconsidered. Much more work must be done to 
triage the most important security vulnerabilities, as opposed to those threats that 
the receive undo amount of popular attention.  
Continued systematic evaluation of cyberspace’s influence on conflict and 
security is needed to produce sound policies grounded in empirics rather than 
speculation. Nonetheless, it should not be a forgone conclusion that all nation states 
will dominate the fifth domain in the future. New media is a potent force, but it is 
also value-neutral and can be equally utilized by citizens, terrorists, and 
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governments. One particularly important question remains: if ICT has not yet 
upended the alignment of global power, is there a tipping point in which it might do 
so?  For this author, such a tipping point is not probable as the Internet is 
fundamentally constrained from affecting the physical realm in the same coercive 
manner as other conventional instruments. That aside, ICT presents very real 
security threats that practitioners cannot ignore. As Cohen once theorized, the 
world may be on the precipice of an information-led transformation of war, but it is 
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